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  Zeller 1
Assessing the Role of Transnational Networks of Support in Color Revolutions: Successes 
and Failures in Georgia, Ukraine, Belarus, and Russia 
Michael C. Zeller, University of Louisville 
It is not important who votes or how, but it is extraordinarily important who counts the votes. 
- Josef Stalin (attributed by his secretary, Boris Bazhanov)1 
 
 In the second decade after the disintegration of the Soviet Union, a sociopolitical 
phenomenon developed in several post-Soviet states: color revolution movements.  Political and 
societal opposition, spurred by electoral fraud perpetrated by (semi-) authoritarian governments, 
sought the restoration of their legitimate voting prerogatives and often the accompanying ouster 
of the prevailing political regime. 
 The phrase “color revolution” typically applies to a series of democratic movements 
produced in part by electoral fraud; while the term originally referred to movements in the 
former Soviet Union that first appeared in the early 2000s, democratic and anti-authoritarian 
movements in Asia and the Middle East have since been labeled “color revolutions.”  Non-
violent resistance, a discernable international element, and student and youth activism number 
among the prominent characteristics of these movements.  A robust and assertive civil society 
represents perhaps the most outstanding feature present in color revolutions.  In these instances, 
civil society is appropriately understood by the definition provided by Alfred Stepan and Juan 
Linz: “that arena of the polity where self-organizing and relatively autonomous groups, 
movements, and individuals attempt to articulate values, to create associations and solidarities, 
and to advance their interests.”2 
                                                 
1 Bazhanov, Boris. Vospominaniya byvshchevo sekretarya Stalina. Parizh: Tretya Bolna, 1980.  
Quote translated by author: “я  считаю,  что совершенно  неважно,  кто и как будет в партии голосовать;  но 
вот что чрезвычайно важно,  это -  кто  и  как  будет  считать  голоса.” 
2 Linz, Juan J., and Alfred Stepan. "Toward Consolidated Democracies." Journal of Democracy 7, no. 2 (1996): 15. 
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 This paper seeks to identify transnational democratic networks that countered (semi-) 
authoritarian regimes in the form of color revolution movements, to examine how regimes have 
responded to this existential threat, and to evaluate the importance of this dynamic in 
determining the success or failure of color revolutions. 
 
Theory Pertaining to Transnational Networks of Support and Color Revolutions 
 The phenomena of color revolutions sparked considerable academic inquisition into the 
commonalities of the movements.  What preconditions and procedural developments 
characterize a color revolution?  Examining movements in Serbia, Georgia, and Ukraine in the 
early 2000s, Michael McFaul concludes that successful color revolutions shared at least seven 
factors: 
1) a semi-autocratic rather than fully autocratic regime; 2) an 
unpopular incumbent; 3) a united and organized opposition; 4) an 
ability to quickly drive home the point that voting results were 
falsified, 5) enough independent media to inform citizens about 
the falsified vote, 6) a political opposition capable of mobilizing 
tens of thousands or more demonstrators to protest electoral fraud, 
and 7) divisions among the regime’s coercive forces. 3 
 
Factors four through six, however, implicate an un-enumerated factor: transnational networks of 
support.  Furthermore, the popularity of an incumbent executive as well as opposition unity may 
be the result of network influence.   
 The organization and effectiveness of political opposition and the dispersion of 
alternative sources of information (to those of the government) frequently depends on the 
influence of domestic and international elements operating within the country.  The intercession 
in political affairs, either directly or indirectly, of foreign agencies and organizations can activate 
or enhance heretofore dormant or underdeveloped nodes of political activity.  Indeed, some non-
                                                 
3 McFaul, Michael. “Transitions from Postcommunism.” Journal of Democracy 16, no. 3 (2005): 7. 
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domestic actors interact with dynamic societal components and endeavor to foster a political 
culture antithetical to the prevailing degree of autocracy in the governing regime. 
 The influence of these “transnational advocacy networks,” is presently undervalued and 
generally misunderstood, according to scholars Margaret Keck and Kathryn Sikkink.4  They 
define such networks as including “those actors working internationally on an issue, who are 
bound together by shared values, a common discourse, and dense exchanges of information and 
of services.”5  That is, groups with common goals and similar temperaments (irrespective of 
nationality) sometimes coalesce into interconnected associations for the purpose of maximizing 
resources and efficacy.  Within these value-oriented nexuses major actors “may include the 
following: (1) international and domestic NGOs, research and advocacy organizations; (2) local 
social movements; (3) foundations; (4) the media; (5) churches, trade unions, consumer 
organizations, intellectuals; (6) parts of regional and international intergovernmental 
organizations; (7) parts of the executive and/or parliamentary branches of governments.”6 
 Transnational advocacy networks frequently develop out of claims of rights violations, 
necessarily involving some government(s). 
Governments are the primary ‘guarantors’ of rights, but also 
among their primary violators. When a government violates or 
refuses to recognize rights, individuals and domestic groups often 
have no recourse within domestic political or judicial arenas. They 
may seek international connections to express their concerns and 
even to protect their lives.7 
 
Keck and Sikkink call this search for international support so as to aggregate and exert greater 
pressure on a state “the boomerang pattern.”  The enlistment of outside support multiplies the 
                                                 
4 Keck, Margaret E., and Kathryn Sikkink. Activists Beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks in International Politics. 
Ithica: Cornell University Press, 1998. 
5 Keck, Margaret E., and Kathryn Sikkink. “Transnational advocacy networks in international and regional politics.” 
International Social Science Journal 51, no. 159 (1999): 89. 
6 Ibid: 91 – 92. 
7 Ibid: 93. 
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force of a domestic actor’s (actors’) effect and impairs the ability of disinclined governments to 
ignore or repress the issue being presented.  Relationships and collaboration among the various 
network constituents quickly becomes elaborate.  The interaction, according to Keck and 
Sikkink, is dynamic; exchanges of funds and other resources, services, and information occur 
frequently inside “a dense web of connections among these groups, both formal and informal.”8  
Thus, suppression of a network not only becomes less acceptable because of the international 
elements, but also less practical due to the sheer intricacy of the system. 
 Yet the context of regime change as a result (at least partially) of transnational political 
network activity demands a definite understanding of the nationality dimension.  That is, 
network resources tend to flow into a given country rather than even or inverse resource 
movement between domestic and international network constituents.  Cursory examination of 
this relationship pattern might imply a dependency of domestic actors upon their foreign 
beneficiaries, that revolutions via such networks are steered by international elements through 
their domestic consumers.  Rather, the aspects of clientelism typically predominate the early 
stages of network relations.  It fades quickly and virtually disappears by the time domestic 
network actors are prepared to challenge an authoritarian system.  “With rare exception, 
domestic actors dominate the drama of regime change; external actors can influence outcomes 
only by working with and through these domestic actors.”9 
 In the cases of color revolutions, it is appropriate to examine some of the larger NGOs 
and state actors that promote healthy civil society and other conditions of democracy, which 
might constitute the major international elements of a network seeking democratic reform or 
revolution.  Valerie Bunce and Sharon Wolchik report that agencies and non-governmental 
                                                 
8 Ibid: 92. 
9 McFaul, Michael. "Ukraine Imports Democracy." International Security 32, no. 2 (2007): 47. 
  Zeller 5
organizations (NGOs) like the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), the 
National Endowment for Democracy, the Open Society Institute, the Organization for Security 
and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), and the European Union have deployed considerable 
resources to the post-Soviet space.  These entities count democratic promotion among their core 
objectives.  Indeed, each of their mission statements reflect this fact: 
 USAID: “Create a more secure, democratic, and prosperous 
world for the benefit of the American people and the 
international community.”10 
 National Endowment for Democracy: “…dedicated to the 
growth and strengthening of democratic institutions around the 
world.”11 
 Open Society Institute: “The Open Society Foundations work 
to build vibrant and tolerant societies whose governments are 
accountable and open to the participation of all people.”12 
 OSCE: “…promoting the full respect of human rights and 
fundamental freedoms.”13 
 European Union (through EuropeAid): “European Union 
believes that democracy and human rights are universal values 
that should be vigorously promoted around the world.” 14 
 
Of the resources that these organizations have committed to the post-Soviet space, Bunce and 
Wolchik demonstrate that the preponderance has been focused “on elections and political-party 
development,”15 that is, building blocks of stable democratic systems.  The democracy assistance 
and promotion of these entities has met with success most in states that: “1) have kept one foot in 
the democratic door, perhaps by holding regular and at least somewhat competitive elections; 2) 
have parties and a developed civil society that can act as local allies for democratization efforts; 
                                                 
10 “Mission Statement of the U.S. Department of State and USAID.” U.S. Department of State. 
http://www.state.gov/s/d/rm/rls/dosstrat/2004/23503.htm. [Author’s italics] 
11 “About the National Endowment for Democracy.” National Endowment for Democracy. 
http://www.ned.org/about 
12 “About Us | Open Society Foundations (OSF).” Open Society Foundations (OSF). 
http://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/about 
13 “What we do.” Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe | OSCE. http://www.osce.org/what 
14 “Development and Cooperation - EuropeAid.” European Commission. ec.europa.eu/europeaid/what/human-
rights/index_en.htm 
15 Bunce, Valerie J., and Sharon L. Wolchik. “Favorable Conditions and Electoral Revolutions.” Journal of 
Democracy 17, no. 4 (2006): 13. 
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3) exhibit short-term democratization-friendly trends such as increasingly competitive local 
elections, popular protests, vigorous legislatures and courts, cooperation among opposition 
groups, and popular opposition leaders; and 4) share borders with states that are both democratic 
and similar to them.”16 
 To be sure, one of the more significant elements of transnational advocacy networks in 
fomenting color revolution movements is the experience of previous movements and the 
diffusion of tactics across borders.  The success of the Otpur movement (a youth activist group) 
in Serbia in the 2000 Bulldozer revolution, for instance, led to the exportation of that model – 
youth advocacy under the principles of non-violent resistance and mass citizen mobilization – to 
neighboring countries: Georgia’s Kmara movement played an integral role in the Rose 
Revolution, Pora in Ukraine’s Orange Revolution, and Zubr in Belarus.  Several methods of 
transnational political networks have dispersed in similar ways, by the movement of experienced 
domestic or international actors to burgeoning democratic movements in other authoritarian or 
semi-authoritarian states. 
 Diffusion is not limited to the democratic opposition networks, however. The experience 
of strongmen leaders in early color revolutions served as a warning to other regional 
authoritarians.  Harassment or outright expulsion of (perceived) opposition organizations or 
agencies, creation of counter-revolutionary political groups and networks, and limits on electoral 
competition and process observation number among the techniques developed in some countries 
of the former Soviet Union to bolster undemocratic regimes.  This response is understood in light 
of the fact that “although most external democracy activists may indeed be primarily interested 
                                                 
16 Ibid: 14. 
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in achieving free and fair elections, they also frequently hope that their efforts will increase the 
likelihood that autocrats will lose office.”17 
 Evgeny Finkel and Yitzhak Brudny identify five major strategies of authoritarian 
incumbents in their attempts to tactically, institutionally, and culturally preempt color revolution 
movements: “isolation, marginalization, distribution, repression, and persuasion.”18  By meting 
out subsidiary variations of these broad strategies, authoritarian regimes restrain societal and 
foreign elements that previously generated color revolutions in neighboring countries. “This 
growing backlash has yet to coalesce into a formal or organized movement. But its proponents 
are clearly learning from and feeding off one another.”19 
 Some scholars 20  hold that robust transnational advocacy networks (with dependable 
support from external constituents like USAID) precipitated regime change even in countries that 
did not possess all the conditions explicated by analysts like Michael McFaul.  If so, what can 
the experience of democratic movements in the post-Soviet space reveal about the function of 
transnational networks of support in color revolutions?  What forms of international support 
were present in the recent democratic movements in Georgia (2003-04), Ukraine (2004-05), 
Belarus (2006), and Russia (2011-12); what was the extent of that support?  What accounts for 
the success or failure of color revolutions in Georgia, Ukraine, Belarus, and Russia to achieve 
regime change?  How did international networks of support – and the challenged government’s 
approach to those elements – factor in the success or failure of these color revolution 
movements? 
                                                 
17 Carothers, Thomas. “The Backlash against Democracy Promotion.” Foreign Affairs 85, no. 2 (2006): 61 – 62. 
18 Finkel, Evgeny, and Yitzhak Brundy. “No More Colour! Authoritarian Regimes and Colour Revolutions in 
Eurasia.” Democratization 19, no. 1 (2012): 6. 
19 Carothers, “The Backlash against Democracy Promotion”: 55. 
20 See especially: Beissinger, Mark R.. “Structure and Example in Modular Political Phenomena: The Diffusion of 
Bulldozer/Rose/Orange/Tulip Revolutions.” Perspectives on Politics 5, no. 2 (2007): 259 - 276. 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/20446423. 
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Methodology 
 The paper investigates four cases of democratic movements in the post-Soviet space – 
Georgia, Ukraine, Belarus, Russia – from a comparativist perspective, identifying similarities 
and differences in the activities of transnational networks of support in order to assess their role 
in the success or failure of the movement.  The examination of transnational network activity 
within two successful color revolution movements (Georgia and Ukraine) and two failed 
movements (Belarus and Russia) allows for an authoritative cross-referencing of causal factors.  
Using Charles Ragin’s method of “Qualitative Comparative Analysis,”21 which employs Boolean 
algebra and John Stuart Mill’s methods of agreement and difference, the paper combines case-
oriented and variable-oriented approaches; it constructs truth tables to scrutinize the roles of 
network activity and governmental response (or “backlash”) in the multi-causality of color 
revolutions.  This method facilitates the analysis of convergent causal prerequisites and 
conditions. 
 Forming comprehensive data regarding transnational networks is often difficult due to the 
various sensitivities pertaining to foreign elements of domestic political phenomena.  
Nevertheless, the exposure of consequential portions and general illumination of network 
activities can provide a firm sense of extent and effect.  To that end, the paper marshals 
expenditure data and relevant statistical information from some of the larger international 
constituents of involved networks (including USAID, E.U., National Endowment for 
Democracy, Open Society Institute, and so on).  The paper, furthermore, cites information from 
domestic organization websites and other sources to illuminate the nature and scope of their 
                                                 
21 For more detailed explanation, see: Ragin, Charles C.. The Comparative Method: Moving Beyond Qualitative and 
Quantitative Strategies. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1987. 
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activity.  Academic articles and news reports are used to detail government actions and events of 
revolutionary periods in the specified cases. 
 The paper further examines the reaction of the challenged regimes to networks’ 
imposition.  Direct and indirect references – passages of domestic criminal codes, laws 
governing non-governmental activity, and news reports of legislative and executive action – to 
governmental action underscore notable instances of opposition suppression or authoritarian 
backlash. 
 In the case of Russia’s 2011 – 2012 movement, the paper incorporates some participant 
observer methods (resulting from this author’s presence in Moscow during the examined events 
as an intern at Society “Memorial” and an observer of political events and happenings) in part 
because a significant body of data and analytical work (relative to earlier cases) has not yet 
emerged regarding the Russian movement.  This direct observation contributes to an enhanced 
accounting of the events and operational activity of transnational network constituents as well as 
governmental counterparts. 
 
Georgia – The Rose Revolution 
 On 2 November 2003, Georgia held national parliamentary elections for just the third 
time since the end of the Georgian Civil War.  Elections in 1995 and 1999 won pluralities for 
President Eduard Shevardnadze’s party, Citizens’ Union of Georgia.22  During his presidency, 
Shevardnadze’s secured financial assistance from the West and cultivated strong relations with 
the United States.  Despite connections to liberal democracies, Shevardnadze’s government 
exercised enough control over Georgia to be accurately termed “semi-autocratic.”  Georgian 
                                                 
22 Several other parties that supported President Shevardnadze joined with Citizens’ Union of Georgia to furnish the 
President with parliamentary majorities. 
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society was generally unmolested by repressive state forces (though with some notable 
exceptions), but government institutions were opaque and disconnected from the citizenry.  
Georgia languished domestically under a stagnant and corrupt economy, which was frequently 
attributed to the wide swath of the economy controlled by members of Shevardnadze’s family.  
Corruption (and nepotism) represented some of the principle charges against the governing 
regime.  By 2003, Shevardnadze’s position was considerably weakened: the Citizens’ Union of 
Georgia had lost local elections a few years earlier and recently dissolved after several 
parliamentary deputies resigned to form other parties; certain media outlets (primarily Rustavi-2) 
had gained traction with their criticism of the government; and, popular opinion polls that 
demonstrated the meager support for the ruling regime enfeebled Shevardnadze’s authority.23  
Thus, election results that heralded a resounding victory for the parties supporting Shevardnadze 
would have been suspect even without the descriptions of mass electoral fraud. 
 The official election results (those upheld by the Central Election Commission and 
Shevardnadze) prompted large demonstrations in the Georgian capital, Tbilisi, and several major 
cities. Persistent activity by the opposition parties and some diplomatic intercession pressured 
Shevardnadze.  He tried to convene the new parliament on 22 November, but fled the plenary 
session when his speech was interrupted by the entrance of protesters (led by Mikhail 
Saakashvili) carrying roses.  Late the next day, after meeting with opposition leaders, President 
Shevardnadze announced his resignation.  Mikhail Saakashvili’s victory (with 96% of the vote) 
in January’s emergency presidential election signaled the triumph of the Rose Revolution. 
Transnational Networks in Georgia before the Rose Revolution 
                                                 
23 Welt, Cory. “Georgia's Rose Revolution: From Regime Weakness to Regime Collapse.” Center for Strategic and 
International Studies 1 (2006). 
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 Most accounts portray Georgia before the Rose Revolution – with regards to the rights 
and liberties exercised by its citizenry – as fairly open.  Charges of corruption and government 
opacity and intractability figured most prominently in charges against the Shevardnadze regime.  
Assessments of Georgia by USAID in the half-decade preceding the Rose Revolution repeatedly 
state that, those ongoing problems notwithstanding, “Georgia has a lively free press, and its laws 
are among the most compliant with Council of Europe (COE) and World Trade Organization 
(WTO) norms.”24  The benefits of Western – especially United States – military, technological, 
and economic assistance likely mollified any apprehensions of President Shevardnadze regarding 
the unfettered activity of media and civil society entities.  This included the political scene, 
where “criticism freely emanated from a number of sources, including political parties across the 
spectrum, NGOs such as the Georgian Young Lawyer’s Association and the Liberty Institute, 
and print and broadcast media.  Thus, a relatively liberal environment within Georgia allowed for 
the growth and interaction of civil society, including its overtly political elements. 
 From the beginning of Shevardnadze’s term until the elections that spawned the Rose 
Revolution, international organizations and agencies engaged every sector of Georgian civil 
society; politically oriented organizations had access to a wealth of resources from foreign 
purveyors of grants, exchanges, information, and training.  Media outlets received grants to 
develop investigative reporting skills, live news coverage capability, and the mass dissemination 
of information; political parties, candidates, and youth activists traveled to the U.S. to witness 
American-style democratic governance, and received training in “message development, 
                                                 
24 See “U.S. Assistance to Eurasia: Georgia” reports in fiscal years (FY) 2000, 2001, 2002, and 2003. 
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campaign tactics, and constituent outreach.”25  In half a decade, Georgian NGOs and Western 
agencies and organizations became deeply interconnected. 
 Numerous groups participated in the political sector of Georgian civil society with the 
expressed purpose of promoting greater democratic governance – not an altogether insidious 
goal, unless you are a semi-autocratic leader.  Several prominent organizations coalesced into 
what can easily be termed a “transnational advocacy network.”  Major foreign/international 
entities included: USAID, the Eurasia Foundation, Internews, International Center for 
Journalists, Soros Open Society Institutes, National Endowment for Democracy, National 
Democratic Institute, OSCE, International Republican Institute, and the British Council.26  The 
most prominent Georgian presences in this network were the Liberty Institute, Internews 
Georgia, Rustavi-2 (as well as other burgeoning independent media outlets), the “Kmara”27 
youth advocacy group, the Georgian Young Lawyers’ Association, and various opposition 
political parties and candidates.  Using joint ventures and collective initiatives, these entities 
developed a politically active civil society. 
 Links between organizations and agencies went through a process that culminated in the 
“dense connections”28 of a transnational advocacy network in the later years of Shevardnadze’s 
period in office.  Early relations were typically of the patron-client variety.  For instance, 
Rustavi-2 originally utilized the Eurasia Foundation for monetary and training resources. In 
1996, two years after its founding, Rustavi-2 received a grant of $9,925.05 from the Eurasia 
Foundation.29  This initial infusion of capital was bolstered when Rustavi-2, through the Eurasia 
                                                 
25 “FY 2001 U.S. Assistance to Eurasia: Georgia” U.S. Department of State. 
http://www.state.gov/p/eur/rls/rpt/c8491.htm 
26 This represents only some of the most visible, active organizations within this network. 
27 “Kmara” means “Enough” in Georgian. 
28 Keck and Sikkink. Activists Beyond Borders. 
29 Anable, David. “The Role of Georgia's Media and Western Aid in the Rose Revolution.” The Harvard 
International Journal of Press/Politics 11, no. 3 (2006): 9. 
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Foundation, made connections with Internews, an American NGO focused on broadcast media 
development. By the time of the falsified election in 2003, Rustavi-2 was a close partner of the 
Eurasia Foundation; the media outlet served as the primary means of broadcasting the 
discrepancies between the parallel vote tabulations (jointly conducted by the Foundation, 
USAID, British Council, and the Open Society Institute) and the “official” election results. 
 The evolution of the Rustavi-2 – Eurasia Foundation relationship was repeated many 
times over with several different organizations.  Figure 1 depicts the links between these 
organizations and some of their multi-party ventures during the Rose Revolution.  This frenzied 
and busy – yet oversimplified – graphic provides some idea of the intricate webs that are created 
by the constituents of transnational advocacy networks.  Once connections are made and become 
Figure 1: A web partially illustrating the interconnectivity of this transnational advocacy network. (graphic created by 
author) 
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entrenched, it is difficult to restrict or curtail the level of interaction, that is, without incurring 
great domestic and international repercussions. 
Network Activity During the Rose Revolution 
 The Rose Revolution was a fairly compact political movement.  Less than three weeks 
passed between the fraudulent parliamentary elections and President Shevardnadze’s resignation 
announcement.  In this period, the aforementioned network of political organizations was highly 
active.  It constituted the major force in decisive matters that depended on opposition activity 
(i.e. not factors like “division among the regime’s coercive forces”): the ability to identify voting 
falsification (election monitors and parallel vote tabulation), media to publicize that information, 
and opposition organized and capable of forming large-scale demonstrations. 
 Before the election, several organizations had prepared to certify the reliability of the 
process and veracity of the results.  USAID “spent $1.5 million to computerize Georgia’s messy 
voter rolls.  The U.S. and European governments also gave OSCE money to deploy an 
unprecedented number of foreign election observers.”30  Furthermore, the National Democratic 
Institute funded monitors, exit polls, and vote counts through a Georgian NGO, International 
Society for Fair Elections and Democracy (ISFED).31  Sponsored by the Open Society Institute, 
opposition party leaders and youth activists – including Mikhail Saakashvili and young 
Georgians who would found Kmara – had visited Serbia to study tactics of the Bulldozer 
Revolution in 2000, and were thus prepared to confront electoral fraud. 
 Exit polls conducted during the day and released on election night by Rustavi-2 showed 
Saakashvili’s National Movement party with a plurality of the vote, 20.8 percent, and thus 
                                                 
30 Fairbanks, Charles. “Georgia's Rose Revolution.” Journal of Democracy 15, no. 2 (2004): 114. 
31 “National Democratic Institute Publications.” National Democratic Institute. 
www.ndi.org/files/1656_ge_parlelectst_111903.pdf. 
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positioned to lead the next parliamentary session.32  Channel One (the state-owned station), 
however, showed For a New Georgia (FNG) (and the pro-Shevardnadze bloc) with a narrow 
advantage and the National Movement with approximately thirteen percent.  Counting continued 
for the next few days, but dissatisfaction and confusion prompted small demonstrations in 
Tbilisi.  Official state results placed the two pro-Shevardnadze parties –FNG and Revival – at the 
top of the polls:33 
ISFED Parallel Vote Tabulation Central Election Commission Results 
- National Movement: 26.60% - FNG: 21.32% 
- FNG: 18.92% - Revival: 18.84% 
- Labor Party: 17.36% - National Movement: 18.08% 
- Democrats: 10.15% - Labor Party: 12.04% 
- Revival: 8.13% - Democrats: 8.79% 
- New Rights Party: 7.99% - New Rights Party: 7.35% 
- Parties under the 7% threshold: 18.84% - Parties under the 7% threshold: 13.58% 
 
The semi-autonomous republic of Adjara proved decisive as it returned drastically inflated 
numbers – votes totaling more than its entire population – for Revival party (alternatively known 
as Union of Democratic Revival, Democratic Union for Revival, or Union for Georgia’s 
Rebirth).   
 Aslan Abashidze, an authoritarian leader with ties to Russia and separatist inclinations, 
ruled Adjara and was the founder of Revival party.  His leadership, which began in 1991, was 
born from the regional chaos of Georgia immediately after its independence from the Soviet 
Union (9 April 1991).  Abashidze held strong ties to Russia; over the he “not only allowed the 
Russian military to maintain bases in Adjara in direct contravention of bilateral and multilateral 
treaties signed by the central government in Tbilisi concerning their removal, but had cultivated 
                                                 
32 Welt, Cory. “Georgia's Rose Revolution”: 16 – 17. 
33 Ibid: 18. Opposition parties are underlined (National Movement, Labor Party, Democrats, and New Rights Party). 
The Labor Party and New Rights Party officially did not participate in the Rose Revolution, instead adopting a 
neutral position. 
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the image among citizens of Adjara that the Russian troops were the ultimate protectors of 
Adjaran semi-independence.”34 Abasidze had nurtured a relationship with the leaders of Moscow 
and was disposed to influence Georgian affairs (to the extent possible) so as to produce results 
satisfactory to the Kremlin; in 2003, this disposition meant tipping the scales in favor of 
Shevardnadze. 
 After four days of totaling (and tinkering with) the region’s votes, the Central Election 
Commission validated the results from Adjara, which claimed 95 percent turnout.  Since 1999, 
Revival and Abashidze supported Shevardnadze and his parliamentary faction in return for the 
understanding that Abashidze ruled Adjara with almost complete autonomy. 35   While this 
arrangement functionally held together Georgia, a country with several potential breakaway 
regions, it was a source of Shevardnadze’s unpopularity.  In November 2003, the notion that 
Adjara’s corrupt returns would be the decisive matter in parliamentary elections simply enraged 
citizens in Tbilisi and the rest of Georgia.  
 During the week following the announcement of official results (6 November), the 
opposition was highly active.  The National Movement and Democrats united and, “together 
with the election monitoring NGO ISFED and the Georgian Young Lawyers’ Association, filed 
legal complaints in over 150 precincts and also lodged official protests against district 
commissions.”36  A series of small demonstrations and counter-demonstrations materialized in 
the center of Tbilisi.  Several thousand constituents of the opposition protested; government 
supporters protested in response.  The first major protest came on 14 November when upwards 
of 20,000 assembled in Freedom Square to demand Shevardnadze’s resignation and free and fair 
                                                 
34 Goltz, Thomas. Georgia Diary: a Chronicle of War and Political Chaos in the Post-Soviet Caucasus. Armonk, 
N.Y.: Sharpe, 2006: 114 – 115. 
35 Welt, “Georgia’s Rose Revolution”: 18. 
36 Ibid: 21. 
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elections.  While that demonstration bore no direct results, the subsequent appearance of 
protesters from Adjara – bussed in to voice support for the government – spurred the opposition 
to continued public protests and campaigns of civil disobedience. 
 During this time, the international elements of the aforementioned transnational political 
network assumed the position of observers or detached commentators.  Several organizations 
released statements after the disparities between the official and ISFED vote counts became 
apparent.  The National Democratic Institute, for instance, released a statement recounting the 
facts and asserting the credibility of ISFED.  Yet such statements were limited to a fairly neutral 
appeal for an easing of political tensions: 
NDI calls on President Shevardnadze, the Georgian government and 
security forces to demonstrate utmost respect for the civil and 
political rights of all citizens in this tense post-election period. At the 
same time, the Institute calls on all political leaders to exhort their 
supporters to respect the rights of others and to act nonviolently.37 
 
Whereas U.S. and European organizations represented the more active segment of the network 
before the fraudulent elections, domestic NGOs and political actors starred in November and the 
events of the Rose Revolution, but only by virtue of the tools and skills honed with the assistance 
of foreign partners. 
 Foreign governments by and large adopted a similar posture, exhorting the conflicting 
parties to peaceably resolve the crisis without interceding directly.  One notable exception: 
Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov traveled to Georgia in mid-November and played a key 
role in brokering the resolution.38 
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 By the third week after the elections, events in the capital and across Georgia had reached 
a fever pitch.  Demonstrations, though not swelling beyond tens of thousands, were persistent; 
political unrest had spread to several other cities; cells of Kmara were clashing with government 
supporters from Adjara; and, amid this national turmoil, President Shevardnadze moved to 
convene a new parliamentary session based on the official election tabulations. 
 As President Shevardnadze began to address the new parliamentary session on 22 
November, Mikhail Saakashvili was leading several thousands of protesters north from Freedom 
Square to the Georgian Parliament Building on Rustaveli Avenue.  In the middle of the 
President’s speech, Saakashvili burst through the double doors of parliament and, holding a 
single rose aloft, demanded Shevardnadze’s resignation.  Shevardnadze quickly absconded 
surrounded by his security detail.  Several hours later, Shevardnadze declared a state of 
emergency and prepared to suppress the demonstrations by force.  “At 9.30 p.m. (1730 GMT) 
four armored personnel carriers, more than 10 buses and mini-buses with soldiers took up 
positions outside Georgia's Interior Ministry.” 39   The military and police forces, however, 
refused to forcibly disperse the protesters and compelled Shevardnadze to meet with the 
opposition leaders. 
 In an one-and-a-half hour conference presided over by Igor Ivanov, Saakashvili and 
Zurab Zhvania (head of the Democrats party) – both former members of Shevardnadze’s 
government, Saakashvili as Minister of Justice and Zhvania as Chairman of parliament – 
convinced Shevardnadze to resign.  The announcement late on Sunday 23 November was greeted 
in downtown Tbilisi with chants of “‘He has left, he has left’ and celebrated with fireworks.”40 
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 Mikhail Saakashvili won January’s emergency presidential election with over 95 percent.  
The National Movement – Democrats coalition secured 67 percent in March’s parliamentary 
elections.  And, Georgia moved forward into a post-Rose Revolution government. 
Effect of Transnational Networks of Support in the Rose Revolution 
 In Georgia, the transnational political network was most important in the run up to the 
revolutionary period, serving as a preparatory force that laid the groundwork for a democratic 
uprising.  The international influence in the years before the Rose Revolution was indispensible 
in actuating hitherto latent or underdeveloped political sectors.  Foreign agencies served as nodes 
of connection for other domestic and international organizations concerned with the democratic 
governance of Georgia.  Yet the domestic NGOs and network elements accomplished the Rose 
Revolution independent of direct guidance by Western affiliates.  
 In the half decade before the Rose Revolution, the U.S. government alone provided 
nearly $800 million in assistance to Georgia.41  This figure includes approximately $80 million 
under the auspices of “democratic reform programs” and the Eurasia Foundation, which do not 
account for some other services – like exchanges and training programs – that may have imbued 
Georgians with wishes and designs on democratic reform.  USAID, moreover, “budgeted more 
democracy-related assistance to Georgia in 2002 and 2003 than to any post-Soviet state except 
the considerably more populous Russia and Ukraine.”42  The immensity of U.S. government aid 
combined with democracy-focused assistance from other governments and private NGOs formed 
an immense arsenal for democratic reformers.  President Shevardnadze’s toleration of the 
network development in Georgia, albeit perhaps without a complete understanding of the threat it 
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represented to his control, ultimately enabled the success of Saakashvili, Zhvania, and the Rose 
Revolution. 
 While it was not the only decisive factor (the police forces’ refusal to suppress the 
protests on 23 November numbering among the pivotal circumstances), the determinative role of 
networks of support cannot be denied in the case of the Rose Revolution.  The relationships built, 
resources shared, and skills acquired in the years before the parliamentary elections were evident 
in the events of November 2003.  Without the foundation provided by the political network of 
support, the Rose Revolution’s manifestation and speedy success are dubious eventualities. 
 
Ukraine – The Orange Revolution 
 In 2004, Ukraine was still just another ex-Soviet state striving to find its post-Soviet 
identity.  Ukraine, which has little history of independence to reference, struggled with the 
pressures and responsibilities of autonomy perhaps more than its neighbors.  Divergent interests 
and perspectives on Ukraine’s future divided the country in 2004, especially its geopolitical 
orientation.  In addition to everything else represented by 2004’s foremost presidential 
candidates, Viktor Yushchenko and Victor Yanukovych embodied east-west regional priorities: 
Yushchenko with domestic and international support in the West, Yanukovych with support in 
east and south Ukraine and assistance from Russia. 
 The ten years preceding the Orange Revolution were dominated by one figure: Leonid 
Kuchma.  Elected in 1994 on promises of greater economic reform and progress and expanded 
trade with Russia, Kuchma slowly repaired Ukraine’s ailing economy (that is, mitigated negative 
growth rates) in his first term.  Societal conditions were not the focus of Kuchma’s early 
presidency, but neither did they escape his attention.  Ukraine, like many other post-Soviet states, 
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benefitted from Western financial assistance, and thus the presiding regime necessarily tolerated 
a certain amount of foreign aid for democracy, civil society, and independent media.  Kuchma 
nevertheless exercised tremendous control over these sectors; most large media outlets 
(especially television channels) were controlled by the government or oligarchs aligned with 
Kuchma’s regime; NGO activity was periodically curbed by government campaigns “against 
both media and civil society freedom.”43 
 The beginning of Kuchma’s second term saw the elevation to prime minister of future 
opposition leader Viktor Yushchenko.  “Pressure from Western donor countries seeking deeper 
economic reforms” secured the promotion of the erstwhile Governor of the National Bank of 
Ukraine.44  Yushchenko at first cut a somewhat bland figure, that of an unassuming (albeit 
capable) banker.  Ukraine’s economy flourished under his policies, reaching nearly six percent 
GDP growth in 2000 and 9.2 percent in 2001. 45   His tenure furthermore coincided with 
successful resolution of “Ukraine’s most urgent social problems: wage arrears to teachers, health 
care workers, and other state employees and overdue pension payments to retirees.”46  
 Under the duress of an opposition protest campaign aimed at removing him from office – 
the “Ukraine without Kuchma” campaign – President Kuchma dismissed Yushchenko for fear of 
his potential political force.  The move, however, “transformed him from a technocrat into an 
opposition leader with a strong public base.”47  His party, Our Ukraine, made a strong showing 
in 2002 parliamentary elections.  By 2004 it was clear that the dynamic Yushchenko and the 
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united opposition – festooned with orange (the color of Our Ukraine) scarves, ribbons, and flags 
– was well-positioned to defeat Kuchma and his hand-picked successor, Yanukovych. 
Transnational Networks in Ukraine before the Orange Revolution 
 Activity in Ukraine’s non-governmental sphere of politics and regime opposition was 
periodically inhibited by government interference.  The measures employed were usually limited 
– focusing most frequently on independent media – and temporary, however.  Even in cases of 
media repression, civil society lobbying often dissuaded Kuchma from implementing serious 
legal restrictions: due to advocacy by the National Association of Broadcasters, for example, 
“President Kuchma vetoed a media law that would have required TV stations to produce election 
debates even if an outlet could not afford to do so” (effectively forcing the closure of smaller, 
independent media stations).48  Overall, Ukrainian NGOs and their Western partner agencies and 
organizations had largely unfettered maneuverability, albeit with sporadic fits of government 
harassment.  
 Perhaps by virtue of its geographic importance and large population (approaching 50 
million, the second largest post-Soviet state population behind Russia), or perhaps because of its 
perceived importance in the post-Soviet order of Europe, Ukraine profited from large amounts of 
democracy assistance and civil society development aid, proportionally more than any other state 
in the former Soviet Union.  In the decade before the Orange Revolution, the U.S. government 
alone annually provided Ukraine with well over $200 million, with “democratic reform 
programs” typically comprising 25 percent of that aid.49  Economic aid, moreover, created an 
expanded middle class, which largely “resented the latticework of corruption that constantly 
ensnared them – from politically motivated multiple tax audits to shakedowns by local officials 
                                                 
48 “FY 2002 U.S. Assistance to Eurasia: Ukraine” U.S. Department of State. 
49 See U.S. Assistance to Eurasia: Ukraine” reports FY 1995 to 2005. 
  Zeller 23
connected to business clans,” and thus added to the population disaffected by Kuchma’s 
regime.50  Throughout the late 1990s the Kuchma regime appeared reasonably comfortable in 
controlling the commanding heights of the government and society (the largest media outlets and 
important industrial sectors like natural gas were owned, operated, or heavily influenced by the 
government), while significant opposition development was underway as a result of transnational 
network development in other sectors of society. 
 USAID in particular implemented an astounding range of programs.  Both directly and 
through a number of implementing partners and subsidiary organizations, USAID sought to 
strengthen Ukrainian NGOs and build resilient centers of political activity.  The Counterpart 
Alliance for Partnership, U.S.-EU Transatlantic Initiative, the U.S. Embassy’s Democracy 
Commission, the National Endowment of Democracy, the Eurasia Foundation, and the Freedom 
House Partnership for Reform in Ukraine (PRU) – all partially funded or enacted by USAID – 
furnished thousands of NGOs with small grant and public policy think tanks (about $10,000 on 
average) in order to promote “youth initiatives and leadership,” “engage policy makers,” and 
“battle against corruption.”51  This last cause particularly engendered an assault on the Kuchma 
regime, which was seen as the bastion of an endemic system of corruption.   
 In late 2000 Kuchma, reelected just over a year before, was implicated in a massive 
government corruption and crime scandal.  His former bodyguard had surreptitiously recorded 
and released conversations where “Kuchma is heard dispensing favors, paying massive 
kickbacks, and conspiring to suppress his opponents – making it clear that the president sat at the 
head of a vast criminal system.”52  The tapes also incriminated Kuchma in the abduction and 
murder of journalist Georgy Gongadze three month earlier.  This factor severely undermined 
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Kushma’s already precarious standing.  The jailing of former Deputy Prime Minister Yulia 
Tymoshenko in early 2001 and dismissal of Prime Minister Yushchenko in May further 
weakened Kuchma.  
 The revelations of the so-called “Cassette Scandal” energized Ukraine’s opposition 
NGOs and activist groups.  Ahead of the 2002 parliamentary elections, activity and connections 
within Ukraine’s opposition political network expanded and flexed its muscles.  Ex-Prime 
Minister Yushchenko joined the growing opposition.  He traveled around Ukraine delivering 
speeches and holding rallies. “These meetings helped create networks of civic and party activists, 
crucial in the organizing of mass protests.” 53   The interpersonal connections created by 
Yushchenko’s personal political activism created the opportunity for domestic and transnational 
partnerships to form, as well as broadening his base of support and increasing his political 
capital. 
 Political party development activity accompanied the pre-election fervor. The NDI and 
IRI expanded programs to train opposition political candidates and campaigns. Hundreds 
annually participated in thorough instructional seminars on citizen-oriented politics and election 
and campaign techniques.  Yushchenko’s Our Ukraine party was one of many to benefit from 
these services.  
 Despite the extreme intimidation tactics exercised by the Kuchma regime, “Ukrainska 
Pravda 54  and Ukraine’s other independent media outlets did not fold or practice self-
censorship.”55  Yet government “manipulation of broadcasting licenses, restriction of distribution 
networks, and…revised criminal and civil codes, which allowed individuals and companies to 
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sue for defamation on many pretexts” pressured non-state news sources.56  In the face of this 
harassment, U.S. government support almost single-handedly sustained numerous independent 
media sources in the two years before parliamentary elections. The U.S. Embassy’s Media 
Development Fund offered hundreds of thousands in grant money for non-state newspapers, 
radio stations, and TV outlets.  Internews, funded by USAID, provided more grants as well as 
training and lobbying services that thwarted the passage of several laws that would have 
eliminated most independent media. 
 A slew of other Western governmental agencies and NGOs contributed to the 
development of civil society and democratic functioning of Ukraine.  The Charles Stuart Mott 
Foundation and the International Renaissance Foundation (funded by George Soros) supported 
domestic polling agencies.  Pora, a student organization modeled on the examples of Otpur 
(from Serbia) and Kmara, received financial support and training from Freedom House, NDI, 
IRI, the German Marshall Fund, and the Canadian International Development Agency. 57  
Furthermore, several youth advocates – members of Pora and Znayu – attended seminars on 
activism and mobilization strategy, “supported by the Alfred Moser Foundation (Netherlands), 
the Westminster Foundation (UK), and the Fund for European Education (Poland).”58 
 Finally, several international support agencies partnered with a handful of Ukrainian 
NGOs to mobilize voters and monitor the conduct of the 2002 elections.  Most prominently, 
Committee of Voters of Ukraine (CVU) received assistance from USAID, EU, OSCE, Internews, 
NDI and others. The CVU produced election-related public service announcements, conducted 
voter mobilization drives, and trained and deployed a few thousand election monitors.  By and 
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large, these measures were highly effective at monitoring election conduct and fairness.  The 
consensus of international and domestic monitors was that the parliamentary election was free 
and fair. 
 Our Ukraine won nearly a quarter of parliamentary seats, the most of any one party in the 
2002 elections.  The Ukrainian parliament remained somewhat independent of Kuchma as a 
result of the election, a fact that would prove integral to Yushchenko’s tactics during the Orange 
Revolution. The efficacy of the various preliminary and election measures of NGOs, political 
parties, and independent media outlets prompted “another anti-NGO campaign through the 
winter of 2003-4, this time backed by Kuchma’s new strong-arm Chief of Staff Victor 
Medvedchuk and his normally reliable allies, the Communist Party of Ukraine.” 59   The 
transnational political network was by now firmly established, however. 
 Examination of the opposition political sphere at this juncture reveals a resilient network 
that, with little alteration (the most notable exception being the 2003 creation of the Channel 5 
television station), would lead the Orange Revolution in two and a half years. The major 
constituents included: 
 International Actors Domestic Actors60 
 The U.S. (especially USAID) Committee of Voters of Ukraine (CVU) 
 European Union Democratic Initiatives Foundation 
 NDI Znayu 
 IRI Kiev International Institute of Sociology (KMIS) 
 Internews Razumkov Centre 
 Eurasia Foundation U.S.-Ukraine Foundation 
 Freedom House Radio Era, Radio Kiev, and Radio Gala 
 OSCE Our Ukraine party 
 NED Yulia Tymoshenko Bloc 
 ENEMO61 Chysta Ukraina (‘Proper Ukraine’) 
 German Marshall Fund Black Pora* 
 Westminster Foundation Yellow Pora* 
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 Liberty Institute Channel 5* 
 Canadian International Development Agency 
 World Bank 
 Charles Stewart Mott Foundation 
 Soros’s International Renaissance Foundation 
 Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency 
 
These actors collaborated closely in the interlude between the parliamentary elections and 2004’s 
presidential vote.  Some parts of this network even formalized their association, such as the 
Freedom of Choice Coalition, which was comprised of several Ukrainian NGOs and opposition 
groups.  This combined resources of many NGOs produced an authoritative election monitor and 
analysis hub (through a website, www.campaign.org.ua), especially effective at tracking 
campaign spending.62 
 The success of Our Ukraine made Yushchenko the opposition’s frontrunner for the 
presidency.  A weak showing by Yulia Tymoshenko’s party, moreover, prompted her to align 
with Our Ukraine and support Yushchenko’s bid, rather than running herself in 2004. 
 The encouraging results in 2002 stimulated an upsurge in opposition activity and 
international support.  Our Ukraine’s strong showing activated hitherto passive international 
elements. Even as the U.S. scaled back its overall aid to Ukraine – corresponding to a general 
deterioration of relations with Kuchma – democratic assistance remained fairly high and indeed 
seemed larger to the opposition, which was receiving a greater proportion of the resources.  
Consistent government corruption and money laundering at the expense of U.S. political party 
and governance development prompted a reallocation of resources: 
The [aid and development programs operated by USAID 
subsidiaries and partners] benefitted all the main political parties, 
including supporters of both Yushchenko and Yanukovych, and 
even many of the fake parties set up by supporters of Yanukovych. 
A large proportion of foreign funding therefore rightly went to the 
government side, yet it was the government side that was often 
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accused of removing monies for partisan use or personal benefit. 
This was one reason for the scale-back of funding in 2003; the 
West was increasingly reluctant to fund projects involving 
compromised, high state officials. A partial consequence was that 
the West worked more with the regime’s critics thereafter. 63 
 
While the U.S. earmarked a greater share of its resources to the opposition political sector, other 
international actors committed greater capital and assets to Ukraine.  For instance, Soros’s 
International Renaissance Foundation spent “$1.65 million between Autumn 2003 and December 
2004” in support of the Freedom of Choice Coalition and activist opposition groups.64 
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Figure 2: A web partially illustrating the interconnectivity of this transnational advocacy network. (graphic created by author) 
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 Domestic parts of the network responded to this bolstered support not only by 
intensifying their projects and pre-election preparations, but also by expanding. Petro 
Poroshenko, an ally of Yushchenko, established Channel 5; it covered both campaigns (as 
opposed to the state-owned media that had largely ignored Yushchenko) and usually portrayed 
Our Ukraine in a positive light.  Although Channel 5 had a broadcast reach of only 37 percent65 
(only available on cable), “it was popular in Kiev and several other cities” from whence the 
preponderance of support for the revolution would originate.66 
 Training sessions and lessons from former leaders of Kmara (Georgia) and Otpur 
(Serbia) led to the creation of Pora (meaning “It’s time”), a Ukrainian youth activism 
organization with two wings: Yellow Pora, a political party focused on the continued diffusion 
of youth activism tactics, and Black Pora, a domestically-focused body geared toward unseating 
Kuchma. 
 The government, however, did launch several efforts aimed at curtailing this activity and 
obstructing Yushchenko’s operations.  At Kuchma’s behest in December 2003, the parliament 
established “an ad hoc commission to investigate foreign and foreign-funded NGOs involved in 
election-related activities.”67  Yushchenko was attacked and impeded in several ways in the year 
before the election. Government-controlled media berated him many times over; obstructing or 
harassing his travels; and, regime forces were likely behind the poisoning of Yushchenko with 
dioxin that nearly killed him and permanently scarred his face. 
 Stunningly, opposition activity proceeded apace, irrespective of harassment from the 
coalition of forces marshaled by Kuchma, Yanukovych, and the Putin regime, which provided 
advice and assistance to Kuchma and Yanukovych.  Almost every member of the opposition 
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political network participated in massive voter mobilization campaigns.  Funded and 
operationally assisted by USAID and the U.S.-Ukraine Foundation, Znayu conducted extensive 
“voter education and get-out-the-vote efforts, recognized by friends and foes as contributors to 
Yushchenko’s electoral success.”68  A joint initiative by Freedom House, NDI, IRI, and the U.S.-
Ukraine Foundation performed similar services in conjunction with local NGOs.  
 The CVU, Pora, Our Ukraine, Internews-Ukraine also took steps to win over the public 
support of Western governments ahead of the election. “Elite networks between Our Ukraine 
leaders and Western leaders nurtured Our Ukraine allies in the West when debates erupted in 
Washington and European capitals about how to respond to the Orange protesters.”69 
 In sum, the U.S. and other Western governments spent approximately $65 million in 
2003 and 2004 in direct support of the opposition, and over $18 million in election-related 
assistance. Private organizations and donors added several millions more.  By the first round of 
the presidential election on 31 October 2004, a trained, experienced, and well-equipped 
opposition network stood ready to enforce its democratic prerogatives.  
Network Activity During the Orange Revolution 
 From the first round of voting on 31 October to the second round revote on 26 December, 
the transnational democracy network in Ukraine deployed immense resources to monitor and 
tabulate the election, protest fraud and illegitimacy, and seek redress of evidence-based 
grievances.  Network activity peaked in the months of November and December 2004 as the 
sinewy bonds connecting its constituents flexed in order to safeguard Ukrainians’ electoral 
rights. 
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 Several NGOs recruited and trained election monitors and observers.  The CVU, with 
funding and instructional assistance from USAID and NDI, “fielded 10,000 domestic monitors 
(accredited as journalists) for each round of the 2004 Presidential elections.”70  The OSCE, IRI, 
NDI, and the U.S.-Ukraine Foundation deployed several hundreds of international observers. 
And, NDI and Freedom House secured the involvement of a large ENEMO monitoring team, 
“which comprised 1,000 observers from seventeen electoral monitoring organizations in 
formerly communist countries.”71  As part of its mission, a detachment of the ENEMO team 
“visited 4,392 polling stations and more than 200 of the 225 territorial election commissions” 
during the second round of voting.  In total, more than 12,000 observers monitored Ukraine’s 
Presidential elections, a staggering number unmatched in post-Soviet history.  
 The other main voting day measures were exit polling and parallel vote tabulation.  
“Eight Western embassies (the U.S., U.K., Canada, the Netherlands, Switzerland, Norway, 
Sweden, and Denmark) and four NGOs (the NED, Charles Stewart Mott Foundation, Eurasia and 
George Soros’s Renaissance Foundation), helped fund the exit polls in each of the three 
rounds,”72 coordinated by the Democratic Initiatives Foundation and conducted by the Kiev 
International Institute for Sociology (KMIS) and the Razumkov Centre.73 The CVU organized a 
parallel vote count and its own exit poll.  These exhaustive methods formed the vanguard of vote 
legitimacy battle in Ukraine. 
 The magnitude of the efforts were not excessive either; after a first round of voting 
significantly less tainted by electoral irregularities (wherein Yushchenko  and Yanukovych each 
received approximately 39 percent), the observers, monitors, and pollsters encountered a second 
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round (on 21 November) rife with sophisticated barrages of voting fraud and election rigging.  
First of all, votes were falsified at the precinct level (i.e. the lowest level of the voting system) – 
through stuffing of the ballot box, “carousel” voting, the removal of votes for Yushchenko, and 
pens filled with disappearing ink in areas of high support for Our Ukraine – where it is most 
difficult to trace.  These methods were not exposed by the CVU’s systematic vote tabulation, 
which relied on figures reported by the precincts.  Election monitors, however, noted these 
activities and recorded evidence that would prove integral in Yushchenko’s follow-on legal 
appeals.  In addition to those precinct-level falsifications, the Central Election Commission 
(CEC) inflated turnout in the eastern regions (especially Donetsk and Luhansk) that supported 
Yanukovych, adding “approximately 1.2 million new votes – well over 90 percent of which went 
to the regime’s favorite.”74  Exit polls, by KMIS and the Razumkov Centre and by the CVU, 
accounted for and discarded practically all falsification and showed Yushchenko with a 53 - 44 
percent lead over Yanukovych, a stark contrast to the official figures: a 49 - 46 victory for 
Yanukovych; “the exit poll established what was credible, and what was not.”75  The CVU 
claimed that 85,000 local officials conspired in the government’s fraud, resulting in over 2.8 
million counterfeit votes for Yanukovych.76 
 It should be noted that a few members of Ukraine’s Security Service (SBU) aided the 
opposition’s detection of electoral fraud. “In the days before and after the runoff vote, a high-
ranking SBU official had kept in regular contact with Oleh Rybachuk, Yushchenko’s chief of 
staff,” as the liaison for the SBU operatives which gathered intelligence about ploys to rig the 
election by the Kuchma regime.77  This intelligence gathering included wiretaps on calls between 
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Viktor Medvedchuk and Yuri Levenets, a Yanukovych campaign advisor, where the two 
colluded in schemes of mass voter fraud.  The evidence collected by the SBU would prove vital 
to the Yushchenko campaign’s voter fraud suit to the Supreme Court.  
 Cries of foul play arose in the middle of Election Day from the Yushchenko camp, which 
called for mass demonstrations to prevent the government from completing its fraud.  
Independent media outlets significantly aided this call to action by publicizing the disparate 
results of the exit polls and the CEC’s official count.  Channel 5 and Ukrainska Pravda 
experienced huge spikes in their audiences in the days after the vote since they were reporting 
the struggle underway.  Responding to the Yushchenko campaign and independent media, over a 
hundred thousand turned out in the evening on 21 November to denounce the electoral fraud. 
 Protests erupted in several other cities the next day, including upwards of 500,000 in 
Kiev.  Amidst that chaos, “Yushchenko declared himself president and took the oath of office in 
an abbreviated session of parliament.”78  His swearing in received some coverage by the state-
owned television stations, which were pressured by the success of Channel 5 to cover the 
opposition movement. 
 Public demonstrations grew, nearing a million in Kiev.  A “tent city” was set up on a 
street adjoining the centrally-located Independence Square, also known simply as “Maidan.”  
This massive and continual street presence, largely maintained by Pora activists and a few key 
NGOs, sustained the protest movement and appreciably complicated the logistics of government 
suppression. McFaul writes: 
Kuchma and his supporters, including those in Moscow, did 
contemplate using coercion to stay in power.  Measuring the 
distribution of power between state and society, however, was not an 
abstract exercise during the Orange Revolution; calculations about 
power could be made based on concrete assessments of crowd sizes 
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and unified will among those in the state wielding coercive power. 
Democratic society was simply too powerful to repress. 79 
 
 The pressure of hundreds of thousands of nearby protesters coupled with appeals from 
the Yushchenko campaign convinced the CEC to defer to the parliament rather than proceed with 
the certification of the vote.  The parliament, in turn, sent the issue to the Supreme Court.  
Deciding on 3 December 2004, “the court used evidence of fraud collected by the CVU and 
other NGOs to annul the official results and call for a replay of the second round later that 
month.”80  Parliamentary speaker Volodymyr Lytvyn, aided by the Presidents of Poland and 
Lithuania and the E.U.’s Foreign Affairs Commissioner, “brokered the specifics of a 
comprehensive agreement. It featured significant new protections in the election law to reduce 
the potential for voter fraud.”81 
 After a generally more open (most notably in terms of media coverage) miniature 
campaign, Ukrainians cast their ballots for President once again on 26 December.  The regional 
divisions remained; Yushchenko won the west and center of the country, Yanukovych the east 
and south. The much cleaner election resulted in a 52 – 44 percent victory for Yushchenko, 
mirroring exit poll results from a month earlier.  President Yushchenko’s inauguration on 23 
January 2005 completed the Orange Revolution. 
 Effect of Transnational Networks of Support in the Orange Revolution 
 In the months after his inauguration, Yushchenko and his campaign team thanked foreign 
support, especially from the United States, for Ukraine’s democracy, civil society, independent 
media, and so on.  Western influence both directly and through domestic organizations arguably 
prevented Ukraine from devolving into a full authoritarian system, and instead limited it to a 
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vulnerable semi-authoritarian scope.  The large proportion of foreign funding in civil society – 
“by some estimates, at least 80 percent”82 – created a large sector with ties to liberal democracies 
of the West rather than the Kuchma regime.  “Intellectual and financial imports from the West 
helped to strengthen Ukraine’s democratic opposition and offset resources transferred from 
Russia” in support of Kuchma and Yanukovych,83 which some estimate at more than $410 
million (in campaign and election support alone).84   That the opposition network prevailed 
against this massive injection of Russian funds for Yanukovych (much more than aggregate 
Western support for Yushchenko in the election year) speaks to the strength of a well-trained and 
active network. 
 The highly visible division of international support – the West for Yushchenko, Russia 
for Yanukovych – rhetorically factored in Ukraine’s campaign as well.  Support from the U.S. 
for Yushchenko prompted derisive remarks from the Yanukovych camp such as referring to him 
as “Bushenko.”  Yet the sentiment underlying such jeers most likely denoted wider appeal for 
Yushchenko; that is, a majority of Ukrainians consider themselves European and their country 
rightfully placed in the company of the West.  NGOs and local organizations that received 
Western support also gained a sort of perceptional boost, an extensively attractive seal of 
approval from the West.  While it certainly would not help in eastern Ukraine, where greater 
sympathy for Russia predominates, the perception of Yushchenko and the opposition network as 
Western probably won them support in contentious electoral regions. 
 However, there appears to be no evidence to support the theory that Western donor 
organizations and agencies unevenly distributed aid and grants.  Indeed, some foreign 
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governmental entities may have insisted on regional balance of assistance so as to avoid 
recriminations of outright bias.  The recipient domestic actors are fairly accorded responsibility 
for the manner in which outside assistance was used.  The east-west division in Ukraine’s 
Orange Revolution was symptomatic of longstanding regional differences and largely unaffected 
by the Western democratic donors. 
 More so than in Georgia, the ruling Ukrainian regime challenged the transnational 
network with measures aimed at restricting their activity.  While the authoritarian backlash of 
Kuchma’s regime did not quite equal other cases (as the examples of Belarus and Russia will 
show), the pressure exerted was significant and testifies to the strength of the democracy 
network. 
 In the delicate balance of governmental and societal forces in Kuchma’s semi-
authoritarian regime, the influence of external constituents of the democracy network was 
significant.  As those organizations curbed Ukraine authoritarian development, they 
simultaneously strengthened the media, opposition parties, civic organizations, and activist 
groups, all of which were vital factors in the success of the revolutionary movement. 
 “The Orange Revolution was a contentious struggle for power between a semi-autocratic 
regime and a democratic opposition, in which the opposition had enough power – the necessary 
strategies, resources, and popular support – to prevail.”85   The development of democratic 
opposition by Western resources and the formation of lasting partnerships and connections 
precipitated the defeat of governmental forces.  Effects of the examined transnational advocacy 
network were fundamental to the democratic victory in the Orange Revolution. 
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Belarus – The Denim Revolution86 
 Belarus represents one of the most politically backward and stagnant cases of the former 
Soviet Union.  Whereas its closest ally – the Russian Federation – experimented with liberal 
democracy in the 1990s, Belarus elected Alexander Lukashenko to the presidency in 1994 and 
now, nearly twenty years later, he remains the leader of Belarus.  Obviously, the democratic 
norm of constitutional term limits is not present in Belarus; that is, President Lukashenko got rid 
of them in a controversial referendum in 2004 (shortly before the end of his hitherto maximum 
second term in office).  Though it is a fully authoritarian state, Belarus has held regular elections 
since the adoption of its constitution in 1994.  These democratic procedures in an otherwise 
undemocratic state have served as flashpoints of Belarusian opposition activity, including the so-
called “Denim Revolution” movement after the 2006 presidential election. 
 Alexander Lukashenko’s early post-Soviet political career had two definite 
characteristics: a uniquely reactionary stance on Belarusian independence and a record of anti-
corruption.  He gained prominence as the head of an anti-corruption commission, where he 
issued largely unsubstantiated (though not incredible) charges of corruption to scores of high-
ranking officials – including the Defense Minister, two vice-premiers, and the speaker of the 
parliament.87  As for the former characteristic, “Mr. Lukashenko prided himself on the fact that 
he was the only political leader from the country who voted against the Brest pact of 1991, which 
proclaimed the end of the Soviet Union.”88 
 Despite Lukashenko’s steady consolidation of power, opposition activity persisted in 
Belarus.  Public protests sprang up around the presidential election of 2001 and the parliament 
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and referendum votes of 2004.  Protests and opposition activity proceeded apace in the months 
before the 2006 presidential election.  During one of the more notable demonstrations, in Minsk 
on 16 September 2005, police confiscated protesters’ independence flags;89 Mikita Sasim, a 
youth activist, responded by removing his jean (or “denim”) shirt and using it as a flag.  An 
extremely popular product in the former Soviet Union, denim evoked not only this incident, but 
also the West.  It quickly became one of the opposition’s key symbols, combining an object of 
preexisting cultural importance with a tactic borrowed from other color revolution movements; 
mobilization efforts typically contained statements like “Come out in the streets of your cities 
and towns in jeans!”90 
 On the night (19 March) of the 2006 presidential vote, a huge crowd – estimated between 
15,000 and 20,000 – formed in October Square in downtown Minsk.  Those assembled supported 
the united opposition candidate Alexander Milinkevich (or else, opposed Lukashenko) and cried 
foul the official election results which declared Lukashenko the victor with 83 (or as much as 86) 
percent. 
 For the next week, October Square was occupied by a fluctuating, though nevertheless 
continuous group of denim-clad revolutionaries. On 25 March, the movement ended with a 
frenzied clash of protesters and riot officers on Okrestina Street.  What opposition network, if 
any, was at work in the Denim revolution; why did it fail to change the Belarusian regime? 
Transnational Networks in Belarus before the Denim Revolution 
 Aside from a brief reprieve in the early 1990s under the leadership of Stanislav 
Shushkevich, Belarus never experienced the sort of post-Soviet recession of governmental 
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control – which typically engendered civil society and opposition development – that occurred in 
the rest of Eastern Europe.  Alexander Lukashenko’s ascension to the presidency heralded anti-
corruption, a focus on economic growth, and above all stability.  Like all other former Soviet 
republics, Belarus’s economy in the early 1990s was marred by negative growth and corruption.  
Reversal of these trends represented Lukashenko’s foremost governing mandate, which he not 
unreasonably associated with stability.  That guiding principal, asserted Lukashenko, meant a 
return (or the closest arrangement) to its indissoluble connection to Russia and the elimination of 
opposition, either to that plan or anything else he decided upon. 
 Referenda in 1995 and 1996 acted on these judgments, reinforcing economic ties with 
Russia and emasculating parliament, practically the only institution capable of countering the 
power of the presidency.  These developments and criminal code reform aimed at restricting 
Belarusian society resulted in the adoption of a policy of selective engagement by Western 
countries.  The E.U. restricted its aid to Belarus, in the words of the European Neighborhood and 
Partnership Instrument, “to humanitarian or regional projects or those which directly support the 
democratization process.”91  Similarly, “virtually all U.S. Government assistance to Belarus is 
targeted at the country’s non-governmental sector, particularly those NGOs that are working to 
promote the development of civil society and the free flow of information.”92  The total aid 
package of the Western governments, therefore, was significantly less than any other country in 
the region.  
 Furthermore, whereas the level of private organizations and funds from abroad ranged 
from small to considerable elsewhere in the post-Soviet space, it was essentially non-existent in 
Belarus.  George Soros, for example, established a branch of his foundation in Belarus in 1994.  
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However, harassment through tax audits and resulting fines amounting to $3 million forced its 
closure in September 1997, ending roughly three years of support (encompassing $13 million) in 
Belarusian education, ecology, health care, and civil society.93   Other private organizations 
forced out of Belarus by government persecution include even the most innocuous NGOs, such 
as the “United States-based City of Hope, which distributes food and clothing in Belarus, and the 
German-financed Chernobyl Children’s Fund.”94  Thus, even before the rash of color revolutions 
in the former Soviet Union, Lukashenko had instituted policies of “authoritarian backlash.” 
 Before detailing the networks that underwrote the Denim Revolution, we must examine 
the state-controlled parameters that circumscribed non-governmental activity.  Unencumbered by 
the notions of integration with the West that had somewhat restrained Shevardnadze and 
Kuchma, President Lukashenko created an extensive legal system to control society.  Changes to 
the Belarusian constitution and criminal code in the 1990s established great latitude for the state 
and its security apparatus – comprised of the KGB, Internal Affairs agencies, Presidential 
Security Service, Ministry of Defense, and border police – in combatting terrorism, preventing 
money laundering, and regulating the movement of assets within and across the country’s 
borders.  Decrees issued by Lukashenko further restricted activity; Presidential Decree No. 8: 
“On the Registration Procedure for Foreign Gratuitous Aid” instituted strict regulations on the 
influx of foreign aid to non-governmental organizations.  In sum, the Belarusian government had 
an extensive and complex legal system that could be easily stretched and construed to pursue 
targeted NGOs and political parties. 
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 Surreptitious means of repression accompanied these legal developments.  Several 
opposition politicians, human rights activists, and critics of the regime have disappeared during 
Lukashenko’s tenure.  Opposition figures of obvious popularity and significant influence 
vanished, like Yury Zakharanka (former Interior Minister) and Viktor Gonchar (a former deputy 
prime minister).  Vocal critics too went missing; Dmitri Zavadsky, a cameraman who had 
covered Lukashenko and later the conflict in Chechnya, “accused government ministers of 
selling arms to Chechen rebels fighting against Russia” 95  disappeared on 7 July 2000; 
businessman and philanthropist Anatol Krasouski supported Viktor Gonchar and went missing 
the same day as him, on 16 September 1999.  This sort of Stalinist activity represented the 
Lukashenko regime’s most intimidating, though not infrequently used, tools. 
 The government took further steps to confine opposition activity in the months ahead of 
the 2006 election.  “A new housing code in early 2005 led to the closing of nearly three-hundred 
local political-party offices that had been lodged in residential properties but which found 
themselves forced by the change to seek space in hopelessly overpriced office buildings.”96  A 
new law required the registration and licensing of NGOs and specified activities.  “Running an 
unregistered NGO, training people in mass-protest techniques, organizing an NGO or political 
party said to ‘hamper execution of its members’ work and family duties,’ or ‘defaming’ the 
Belarusian republic in the international arena” numbered among the new prohibitions, punished 
by fines and jail terms of up to three years.97  Pavel Seviarynets, the leader of Young Front – a 
youth activist group similar to Kmara and Pora – was one of many opposition figures arrested 
due to purported violations of this new portion of the criminal code.  In May 2005, he was 
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sentenced to two years or corrective labor in Maloye Sitna, a tiny village near Belarus’s northern 
border with Russia.98  In effect, several influential opposition figures like Seviarynets were 
exiled to the periphery of Belarus, far from the centrally located Minsk, for the months before 
and after the presidential vote. 
 Nevertheless, that vast arsenal of repressive mechanisms notwithstanding, a small but 
resilient transnational network of opposition operated in Belarus.  Its size and scope were 
significantly less than its “rose” and “orange” counterparts. Indeed, it is much easier to form a 
nearly comprehensive list of its constituents: 
 International Actors Domestic Actors 
 The U.S. (especially USAID) Zubr (meaning ‘Bison’), a youth activist group 
 European Union Young Front 
 NDI Charter 97 
 IRI IISEPS 
 NED Office for a Democratic Belarus 
 Internews Partnership 
 Eurasia Foundation Belarusian Initiative Center 
 Freedom House Belarusian Association of Journalists 
 OSCE Narodnaya Volya, Nasha Niva, Belarusy i Rynok  
 Counterpart Alliance for Partnership  (newspapers) 
 ABA/CEELI99 United Civil, ‘Fair World,’ Social Democrats, 
 U.N. Development Program  Popular Front (political parties) 
 International Labor Org. Independent Trade Union, Free Trade Union, 
 European Radio Belarus  Organization of Working Women (unions) 
 
 In the decade before the Denim Revolution, the U.S. government and its agencies 
(including USAID, NDI, IRI, Eurasia Foundation, and NED) spent over $250 million in support 
to Belarus.100  About half of this assistance was in the form of humanitarian aid from the U.S. 
Department of Defense and privately donated commodities.  The other half – or approximately 
$125 million – funded typical operations, though on a much smaller scale than in previous cases. 
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 IRI and NDI worked closely with local branches of the major opposition parties, and 
conducted training and seminars through organizations like the Belarusian Initiative Center.  
USAID-funded Internews projects engaged local television stations – though this ultimately 
proved ineffectual as the medium of television was the primary tool of Lukashenko’s propaganda 
and therefore was tightly controlled by the state.  USAID worked with most of the nation’s print 
media, including the major opposition newspapers: Narodnaya Volya (“the People’s Will”), 
Nasha Niva (“Our Field” or “Our Land”), and Belarusy i Rynok (“Belarus and Market”); a large 
part of the focus was adapting the newspapers to web-based formats, a policy that has had far-
reaching consequences in Belarusian opposition activity.  The American Bar Association through 
its CEELI program provided legal advice and assistance to NGOs and political parties, 
mitigating the strain of government harassment.  Grants from the U.S. Embassy, Eurasia 
Foundation, NED, and Freedom House provided thousands of grants “in support of independent 
print and electronic media, youth and women’s groups, human rights groups, independent trade 
unions, and other pro-democracy organizations.”101 
 The E.U. provided some minor support as well.  Approximately $11 million (€8 million) 
in TACIS (Technical Aid to the Commonwealth of Independent States) funds went to Belarus in 
2005-2006.102  Over $7 million of these funds went into projects that supported education, 
training, media, and other forces for democratization.  The E.U.’s main implementing partners in 
these ventures were the OSCE and the U.N. Development Program. 
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 Perhaps the most notable aspect of the transnational network at work in 2006 was its very 
evident attempts to formalize sub-networks.  The major opposition political parties, acting on the 
advice of NDI workers, united in the “Ten Plus Coalition, a group of democratic parties and civic 
organizations.”103  The Coalition’s Congress of Democratic Forces in October 2005 nominated a 
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presidential candidate, Alexander Milinkevich, to represent the united opposition.  The Office for 
a Democratic Belarus, the Belarusian Association of Journalists, and several other organizations 
joined in the Assembly of Democratic NGOs to promote the development of civil society.  Such 
associations certainly multiplied the efficacy of the opposition network.  The combined efforts of 
these sub-networks, for instance, “raised the nationwide name recognition of [Milinkevich] from 
5% before the [nominating congress in October] to nearly 100% just prior to the elections.”104 
 Government pressure, nevertheless, was unrelenting.  Several NGOs and parties were 
forced to close or to reduce operations drastically due to pressure from the government.  Most 
notably, the Independent Institute for Socio-Economic and Political Studies (IISEPS) and the 
NGO Partnership were incapacitated during the election season.  IISEPS, a polling agency 
aiming to “promote civil society and free market economy in Belarus,”105 was handicapped by a 
court order in early 2005 that revoked their license for conducting polls.  Partnership was 
Belarus’s only domestic election-monitoring group; several of its principals were arrested a 
month before the election on, among other indictments, charges of terrorism.  Video of the 
leaders’ confession to their crimes was publicized days before the election.106  Thus were two 
important elements of previous color revolutions, polling and election monitors, severely 
undermined.  Indeed, the entirety of the opposition – independent media, political parties, and 
NGOs (all of which were so vital to color movements in previous cases) – were squeezed by 
official and unofficial state pressures in the months ahead of the elections, so that opposition 
activity was severely restricted by March 2006. 
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 Finally, Lukashenko utilized state resources throughout the last weeks before to his 
greatest advantage.  While impeding Milinkevich’s travel throughout the country, Lukashenko 
continued his most longstanding campaign tool: symbolic politics.107  State television portrays 
Lukashenko as a dynamic figure, and conveys “the impression of a very personal supervision of 
society.”108  He is shown playing hockey, attending a ceremony of the nation’s gas industry, 
driving a large truck on a farm, inspecting a mining operation, and meeting with world leaders.109  
Milinkevich, by comparison, received practically no coverage by national media aside from a 
brief speech at the registration of presidential candidates ceremony. 
 The 2006 presidential election figured to be just another pretense to shore up 
Lukashenko’s “democratic” regime. 
Network Activity During the Denim Revolution 
 No opposition media outlets covered the election.  Government forces prevented 
independent newspapers from issuing copies, “web pages were shut down, and the independent 
news agency Belapan also ran into difficulties.”110   State television proclaimed victory for 
Lukashenko and warned of possible attempts by the opposition to overthrow the government.  
 The reported figures held that Lukashenko had received 83 percent of votes, Milinkevich 
6.1 percent, Haidukevich (a pro-Lukashenko candidate) 3.5 percent, and Kazulin (an opposition 
candidate aligned with Milikevich’s supporters) 2.2 percent.  The U.S., E.U., and OSCE all 
declared the elections illegitimate; Russian monitors criticized the West for prejudging the nature 
of the elections, and deemed the process free and fair.  Responding to vague calls by opposition 
leaders before and early on Election Day, several thousand Minsk residents gathered in October 
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Square to protest the results.  Few of the protesters claimed victory for Milinkevich; rather, they 
claimed that Lukashenko’s percentage was impossibly high, citing “non-governmental polls, 
such as those conducted by Manayev [a sociologist with the IISEPS], indicate that support for 
the president at the time of the election was around or over 50%.”111   
 It remains unclear exactly how the electoral fraud was perpetrated.  A documentary about 
the Denim Revolution, Kalinovski Square, briefly explained that a poll in one town (Maloye 
Sitna) supported Milinkevich at 70 percent; the official results recorded 95 percent of the town’s 
votes for Lukashenko.112  
 In any case, upwards of 20,000 had gathered in October Square by late election night to 
decry the clearly fraudulent vote count, “despite KGB threats to charge protesters with terrorism 
and press for the death penalty.”113  Members of Zubr and Young Front – many of whom 
witnessed the Orange Revolution sixteen months earlier – organized the demonstration, erection 
of a tent city, and occupation of the square.  However, there was “little in the way of planning or 
coordination between civil society radicals and opposition leaders.”114  
 The number of protesters diminished in the following days.  No signs of dissention within 
the regime or state-controlled media appeared as in previous cases.  Indeed, the media’s limited 
coverage of the protest was consistently defamatory and scathing.  State security forces arrested 
anyone attempting to exit or enter the square and intercepted all food and provisions brought for 
the demonstrators.  Groups of Lukashenko supporters were deployed as counterdemonstrators 
and agitators.  Finally, when the number of protesters had dwindled to a few hundred on 24 
March, riot police stormed the square, arrested the 328 remaining occupants, and dismantled the 
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tent city.115  The next day, Alexander Kazulin led several thousand (between 5,000 and 20,000) 
in a march back to October Square, but a wall of riot officers blocked the way.  The march 
instead moved towards the detention facility on Okrestina Street, where many of the detained 
protesters were supposedly being held.  The police dispersed the march in “a bloody melee that 
left thousands beaten up, several of them in grave condition, tear-gassed, stunned with 
percussion grenades and chased all over town by club-wielding policemen.”116  The only tangible 
result of the Denim Revolution movement was an eight-day delay in Lukashenko’s re-
inauguration ceremony. 
Effect of Transnational Networks of Support in the Denim Revolution 
 Most of the keys to successful color revolutions were missing in Belarus and the Denim 
Revolution movement.  Lukashenko is an unconstrained autocrat; he is fairly popular (over 50 
percent approval in almost any poll); the regime’s security apparatus is united behind him; and 
the mobilizing ability of the opposition was severely encumbered by government harassment and 
suppression. 
 Although there were no exit polls or parallel vote tabulations, the opposition did not 
contend that their candidate(s) had received more votes than Lukashenko.  An IISEPS poll weeks 
after the election approximated the real results at 63 percent for Lukashenko, 20 percent for 
Milinkevich.117  Opposition activity successfully made Milinkevich into a national figure; he 
never exuded the dynamism of Saakashvili or Yushchenko.  For his part, Lukashenko admitted 
to election falsification, albeit in the opposite direction.  In a meeting with Ukrainian journalists, 
Lukashenko said: 
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We falsified the last elections, I already told the westerners.  93.5 
percent voted for Lukashenko. This is not a European figure, they 
said. So we made it 86… Before the elections they told us that if 
our election figures were European, that they would accept our 
election. We made European figures. But, as you see, they didn’t 
accept them.118 
 
 The question under circumstances like those in Lukashenko’s Belarus is: “can a 
democratic opposition make any progress by taking part in such a twisted process – one which, 
moreover, is designed to destroy whatever faith society might have in alternatives to an 
authoritarian regime? The case of Belarus suggests that the surprising answer is yes.”119  Even in 
the face of harsh authoritarian suppression, a small, insufficiently supported but nevertheless 
interconnected opposition in a network system can reach elements of society beyond its base of 
activists, dissidents, and opposition politicians.  The surprise is not that the Denim Revolution 
movement failed, but rather that it occurred at all.  The regime was simply not vulnerable to 
revolution, but the unprecedented public dissent arguably occurred because of the resilience of 
the opposition network, erected as it was with the help of foreign partners and utilized in March 
2006 by its domestic constituents. 
 
Russia – The For Fair Elections movement120 
 The Russian Federation, representing the largest country and principal heir of the former 
Soviet Union, became the greatest focus of post-Soviet international aid.  Foreign government 
aid to Russia in the 1990s surpassed $1 billion per annum; the total influx of private aid most 
likely approached this figure. 
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 An explosion of free societal activity characterized Russia during Boris Yeltsin’s 
presidential tenure (1991 – 1999).  Yet, besides opening Russia up to foreign donors, agencies, 
and organizations, the newfound and unchecked freedom resulted in unprecedented corruption.  
Government officials and unscrupulous “oligarchs” used their influence to enrich themselves 
with formerly state-owned industries and businesses. 
 Vladimir Putin’s regime, in place since late 1999, has done much to decrease this 
rampant oligarchical corruption.  The reassertion of state predominance under Putin, however, 
has extended to virtually all sectors of society, not just industry.  Since Putin’s ascension to the 
presidency, the government – not always with Putin’s public endorsement, though seemingly at 
his behest – has implemented numerous restrictions on the allocation of foreign aid and the free 
operation of political and civil society entities.  Understandably, various actors and individuals, 
chafing from these constraints, rallied to Putin’s opposition.  Yet, among the many disaffected 
members of Russian society – pensioners, communists yearning for a return to the Soviet system, 
ethnic minorities, and nationalists to name a few – democrats are just another group of the 
relatively small, active opponents of Putin’s regime. 
 Nevertheless, the reinvigoration of authoritarian practices in Putin’s Russia has triggered 
substantial opposition activity.  From the early 2000s to the middle of President Dmitri 
Medvedev’s121 tenure (2010), anywhere from dozens to a few thousand people participated in 
public demonstrations of opposition to Putin or some facet of his regime.  Shortly before the 
December 2011 parliamentary or “Duma” elections, however, protest activity was epitomized by 
the actions of Strategy-31 activists.  This opposition group, which formed to protest the 
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abridgement of constitutionally-enshrined (in article 31) freedom of assembly, attempted to hold 
regular protests at Triumfalnaya Ploshchad (“Triumphal Square”) in central Moscow on the 31st 
day of every month with 31 days.  Over the course of two hours on 31 October 2011, a few 
dozen activists shouted slogans and interacted with the scores of journalists while hundreds of 
riot officers (easily more than four to every activist, journalist, or layperson in the square) 
patrolled the scene, continually ordered people to vacate the square, and wrestled active 
protesters from the crowd and escorted them to a chorus of “Pozor! Pozor! Pozor!” (“Shame [on 
the police]!”). 
 Then, widespread claims of fraud in the 4 December parliamentary elections provoked an 
impromptu gathering the next day of over 5,000 whistleblowers (many protesters blowing on 
plastic red whistles), denouncing the electoral falsification.  Five days later (on 10 December) a 
crowd of tens of thousands (between 25,000 and 80,000 depending on whether one inquired with 
the police or with the protest organizers) assembled on Bolotnaya Ploshchad (“Marshy Square”).  
The outpouring of opposition was the largest seen in Russia since the collapse of the Soviet 
Union.  It kicked off a sustained campaign by the political opponents of Putin’s regime to 
demand fair elections and protest in the public spaces of Moscow and other Russian cities until 
that “reasonable demand,” among others, was met.  Over a year as well as the presidential 
election (4 March 2012) and inauguration (7 May 2012) have passed and the opposition has 
achieved no substantive victories in changing the regime.  Indeed, Putin’s return to the 
Presidency coincided with a new assault on political opposition and civil society by the Russian 
government.  The opposition movement that began on 4 December 2011 is still limping on as of 
the beginning of 2013. 
Transnational Networks in Russia before the For Fair Elections Movement 
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 Color revolutions in bordering countries most definitely provoked a government backlash 
against potentially revolutionary elements in Russian society.  Putin has expressed concern over 
the movements in a characteristic mocking style: 
‘What is most dangerous, you know, is the creation of a system of 
permanent revolution, whether that be “rose” [rosovykh] or some 
yet-to-be-invented “blue” [golubykh].’ In this sentence, he attacked 
the ‘Rose Revolution’ on two levels.  First, in an attempt at 
homophobic humor, he played on the Russian slang meanings of 
‘rose’ as lesbian and ‘blue’ as gay male.  Second, he tried to 
tarnish Georgia’s deliberately self-limiting revolution with the 
notion of ‘permanent revolution’, which both harked back to 
Soviet anti-Trotskyite propaganda and evoked memories of 
Russia’s turmoil during the early 1990s.122 
 
While a firmer hand with civil society and “foreign interference” was detected in his first 
presidential term, Putin oversaw the passage of a seminal piece of legislation in early 2006: the 
Russian Federation Law, On Introducing Amendments to Certain Legislative Acts of the Russian 
Federation, more commonly known as the 2006 Russian NGO Law.  The shorter, less cryptic 
title speaks to the target of the legislation.  The law “introduced burdensome and difficult-to-
meet reporting requirements for NGOs, accompanied by severe penalties for non-compliance; 
new and similarly burdensome registration procedures for Russian and foreign NGOs operating 
in Russia; and new broad powers of the registration bodies to audit the activities of NGOs.”123  
The pretext of the law came from FSB Director Nikolai Patrushev’s May 2005 speech to 
parliament, where he asserted that foreign agents (explicitly naming IRI and NED) “were using 
NGOs to undermine Russia’s security.124  Like with other parts of Russian law, NGOs and 
opposition groups feared the “selective implementation” practices of government organs; that is, 
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the law would be a tool used to pursue organizations of concern to the government, rather than 
being applied fairly to all civil society (a daunting prospect on its own).  The application of this 
and other Russian laws – especially the Law on Public Associations, the 2002 Law on 
Countering Extremist Activity, and certain articles of the Criminal Code, like articles 280 and 
282125 – shrank the number of NGOs from over 600,000 to just 220,000.126  
 Within this hostile environment, an enlarged but familiar (USAID, NDI, IRI, NED, E.U., 
Soros’s Open Society Foundation, Internews-Russia, and so on) group of foreign organizations, 
agencies, and governments provided regular assistance to squeezed sectors of Russian society.  
Millions of dollars flowed from foreign organizations and governments to Russian grantees.  In 
2010 alone, George Soros’s Foundation dispensed over $6 million to a dozen Russian 
organizations.127  NED, supported by USAID, provided $4.15 million in the form of 74 grants, 
including $71,242 for election polling by the Levada Center, $46,902 for the development of the 
East European Democratic Center’s “crossborder network of civil society organizations,” 
$80,000 for AGORA’s legal defense initiative, and $325,961 over seven project grants to 
branches of Society “Memorial.”128 
 Some of the most notable Russian opposition beneficiaries of the transnational network 
are: 
Notable Russian actors: 
Solidarity (Solidarnost), liberal democratic party coalition 
Strategy-31, activist group 
Yabloko (“apple”), political party 
People’s Democratic Union, political party 
Golos (“voice”), election monitoring group 
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Dozhd (“rain”) television channel 
Society “Memorial,” a human rights and historical truth organization 
The Other Russia, a political party coalition 
Carnegie Moscow Center, think tank 
AGORA, human rights watchdog group 
Levada Center, polling and sociological research institute 
The Khimki Forest Defense Movement, environmental activist group 
Echo of Moscow, radio station 
A Just Russia, political party 
Novaya Gazetta (“New Gazette”), newspaper 
 
In recent years opponents of the Putin regime have made several attempts to formalize domestic 
sub-networks and create greater unity. A slew of untenable party coalitions and conventions like 
2004’s All-Russian Civic Congress endeavored to create deep, resilient, and longstanding bonds 
of opposition unity. The vast ideological disparities between opposition forces, however, 
hindered the establishment of sustainable coalitions.  Furthermore, Russia’s opposition consists 
of several influential leaders, each with their own base of support.  This reality constituted a 
major obstacle to opposition unity; the For Fair Elections movement would reconnoiter this 
problem and only manage to create a system that froze the parity of opposition leaders’ 
popularity. 
 Though not fully seized upon, the array of political parties, non-governmental 
organizations, and international sources of support was vast.  The Putin government, unlike any 
other cases, went beyond simple authoritarian methods of cowing the opposition; it developed 
several proactive, ostensibly non-governmental means of disrupting or countering opposition 
activity. 
 Gleb Pavlovskii, advisor to the Kremlin, pioneered new defenses against color movement 
opposition.  He asserted, “The most important thing to avoid was a passive, defensive 
posture.”129  Accordingly, a network of counter-revolutionary groups was created. The most 
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well-known element of this apparatus is the pro-Putin youth group, Nashi (meaning “Ours”).  It 
was created on the model of Otpur and Kmara, but for the purpose of bolstering rather than 
opposing the regime.  Since its formation in 2005, detachments of Nashi members frequently 
stalked and harassed opposition demonstrations, practically unchecked by the police no matter 
what their provocative action. 
 The government also utilizes state-owned or aligned polling and media sources to 
undermine opposition activity.  Critics often lambast the All-Russian Center for the Study of 
Public Opinion, or VTsIOM for manipulation of polling and surveys in favor of the Putin 
regime.  Citizen Watch, an election monitoring NGO with ties to the government, acts as a pro-
government mirror to Golos.  Media outlets too form part of the governments network; NTV, for 
example, habitually conducts “investigative reports” aimed at exposing the purportedly corrupt 
and seditious practices of opposition parties, leaders, and organizations.  NTV functions with a 
fair degree of impunity and rarely falls prey to Russia’s harsh libel laws (though their conduct, 
by many accounts, often qualifies as libelous). 
 In spite of the various and extensive tactics employed to stifle and disrupt, the opposition 
to Putin’s regime persevered.  Indeed, pervasive decline in the popularity of ruling party United 
Russia gave hope to the opposition.  Levada Center polls indicated diminished approval of 
United Russia and consistent doubt regarding the veracity of elections (see Appendix I).  The 
December 2011 parliamentary vote represented a significant opportunity for anti-Putin forces, 
but little confidence could reasonably exist that any mass outburst of dissent would occur 
following the vote, whether it was falsified or not. 
Network Activity During the For Fair Elections movement 
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 Examining the course of events from 4 December 2011 to 7 May 2012 and beyond 
requires one to contend with the distinctively non- (or even anti-) color revolution atmosphere of 
early protests.  Golos tracked the conduct of the elections throughout the country via a series of 
volunteer monitors and live video streams of polling places.  An online mapping application – 
developed in part with USAID and NED funds – that differentiated between many types of 
electoral fraud made access to accounts of the vote’s fairness available to everyone with an 
internet connection.  In all, Golos recorded 7,801 cases of fraudulent activity.130  The official 
figures, which were already underwhelming for United Russia as it signaled the loss of the 
legislative super majority that they had held since 2003 and was consistent with diminishing 
popularity in local elections, were further palled for the party of power by widespread incidents 
of fraud:131 
- United Russia: 49.31 percent 
- Communist Party: 19.19 percent 
- A Just Russia: 13.25 percent 
- Liberal-Democratic Party: 11.68 percent 
 
Perhaps the domestic entity most disposed to a network system (boasting strong ties both to 
international partners like USAID, NED, OSCE, and the Open Society Foundation, and to 
domestic actors like Society “Memorial” and the Sakharov Centre), Golos was able to withstand 
intense pressure from the regime before and after the election period.  Cyber-attacks, government 
raids, harassment by NTV, Nashi demonstrations outside their office, and fines number among 
the assault tactics employed by the regime.  Despite these hindrances, Golos fielded a few 
thousand official election monitors (and utilized supplementary volunteers and distance 
observation methods) during the parliamentary vote.  A statement the day after the elections 
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announced preliminary findings: support for United Russia was inflated throughout the country, 
especially in the Caucus regions (such as the Chechen Republic which recorded 99.5 percent for 
United Russia) and in the districts of Moscow (with wild variation between districts, indicative 
of vote tampering).132   Subsequent reports confirmed these findings and questioned United 
Russia’s already subpar performance. 
 While these reports fueled opposition outrage, the protest movement that thereafter 
coalesced under the banner of “For Fair Elections” did not adopt a revolutionary posture.  
Speeches at December’s protests often declared that the objective was fair elections, not 
revolution.  Indeed, the rhetorical moderation in calls to action often strained to declare, perhaps 
for the benefit of the ubiquitous forces of the interior ministry, that this was not a color 
movement.  This stance might have resulted from two related polling concerns.  First, while 
some speculation amongst independent polling agencies and protesters placed United Russia’s 
total percentage of the vote in the low 30s, sometimes even in second place to the communists, 
clearly either United Russia or the Communist Party (typically in agreement with the ruling 
United Russia) had won the election. Second, the level of Putin’s popularity had not matched the 
plummeting of United Russia’s support.  Over half the country still approved of Putin, and thus 
no mandate for regime change existed on any front.  Yet the tens of thousands that gathered on 
Bolotnaya Square a week after chanted slogans like “Russia without Putin!,” “Russia will be 
free!,” “we have the power!,” and so on.  Hints of a more radical tenor appeared from the likes of 
Alexei Navalny (a lawyer and anti-corruption blogger with the largest support base of opposition 
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leaders), who said proclaimed to the nearly 100,000 assembled on Sakharov Avenue on 24 
December: “We are peaceful people, but we cannot suffer endlessly.”133 
 Through the first two months after elections, the For Fair Elections movement made no 
visible progress on achieving its main objectives, which, though sometimes obfuscated by the 
many voices of the oppositions leadership, can be said to include the annulment of the 4 
December election results, a new vote conducted freely and fairly, and the resignation and 
investigation of Central Election Commission Chairman Vladimir Churov. 
 The first major demonstration after the long Russian holidays was held on 4 February 
2012, a march from Kaluzhskaya Square to a rally on Bolotnaya.  Braving subzero temperatures, 
well over 100,000 people turned out to denounce the Putin regime and the parliamentary 
elections.  Stamping their feet and rubbing their hands (or in extreme cases, going to the 
warming tent at the opposite end of the square), the assembly listened to speeches and musical 
performances.  Late Soviet anthems of dissent such as Viktor Tsoi’s song “Peremen” (“Change”) 
and live performances from the likes of Yuri Shevchuk harked back to the dissent of the late 
1980s and early 1990s. 
 The 4 February rally also witnessed the elaboration of a fiercely nationalist message.  
State-owned media and government officials had denounced or dismissed the nascent democratic 
movement as an instrument of Western intervention in Russia’s internal affairs – a common 
charge, and one to which Russians seem to be particularly sensitive.  The response of several 
opposition figures was to deny the claim, assert their distaste for America, and allege Putin’s 
collusion with the U.S.  Left Front leader Sergei Udaltsov typified this development: 
[Government counterdemonstrations] accuse us, alleging that we are acting on the 
interests of the USA, that we want to split up Russia.  But, I am here saying it’s 
lies and provocation; lies, b*******, and provocation! Excuse me for the coarse 
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word.  In 1999, when America bombed Yugoslavia, I was by the embassy, there 
throwing s*** at the American embassy with everyone…But where was Putin 
then? Where were you? Where was Medvedev? … That’s who works in the 
interests of America.134 
 
Whereas Western support constituted almost a point of pride in Georgia and Ukraine, the 
existence of U.S.-assisted opposition elements was shameful to several major leaders of the For 
Fair Elections movement, who perhaps feared the general public’s supposed antipathy to 
American elements in Russia.  While the West 
disapproved of the conduct of Russia’s 
elections, the comments of Udaltsov and others 
surely did not elicit the kind of diplomatic 
pressure that bolstered Yushchenko and Our 
Ukraine. 
 For Fair Elections leaders were denied a 
permit to demonstrate once more before the 4 
March presidential election, so they organized 
an event called “White Circle.”  On 26 
February, as many as 40,000 people 135  lined 
Moscow’s Garden Ring Road, festooned with 
white ribbons, holding white balloons, and 
waving white flags and flowers.  Opposition leaders were interspersed along the ring; 
sympathetic motorists drove around the 10-mile 
loop, holding flags out their windows and 
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honking in support (or else because the protest was causing several traffic jams); and, groups of 
pro-government youth activists deployed at several points along the road and wore signs that said 
“Putin loves all” or “one week until Putin’s victory”.  
 The Presidential election was held on 4 March.  No major protest was scheduled for that 
evening, but the anticipation of more fraud led opposition leaders to prepare for a rally the 
following night.  Official results and state media heralded a clear, decisive, and legitimate 
victory for Vladimir Putin:136 
- Vladimir V. Putin: 63.6 percent 
- Gennady A. Zyuganov (Communist Party): 17.18 percent 
- Mikhail D. Prokhorov: 7.98 percent 
- Vladimir V. Zhirinovsky: 6.22 percent 
- Sergei M. Mironov: 3.85 percent 
 
While few if any doubted that Putin legitimately won at minimum an overwhelming plurality, 
Golos did monitor claims of fraud, registering 5,229 instances on its website.  Irregularities were 
concentrated in cities (especially Moscow and St. Petersburg) and in southern Russia, where 
places like Rostov region reported 146 percent turnout.  Such comical signs of fraud provided 
fodder for subsequent protests: “Elections cannot be fair when all 146% don’t vote” read one 
woman’s sign at a rally on 10 March.137  A teary-eyed victory speech by President-elect Putin 
similarly provoked the ire of opposition protesters: “Moscow does not believe in tears” 
(referencing a movie from the late Soviet period) appeared on several placards at the 5 March 
demonstration. 
                                                 




137 Observed and translated by author. 
  Zeller 61
 The rallies on 5 and 10 March involved “crowds of just 10,000 to 25,000,”138 signaling to 
some that the fervor of dissent was waning.  Violent action by riot officers at the end of the 5 
March event on Pushkin Square, moreover, did not bode well for the opposition.  Hundreds were 
arrested – including Sergei Udaltsov, Alexei Navalny, and Ilya Yashin – in that melee on the 
pretext that they violated the terms of their assembly permit and did not vacate the Square by 
nine o’clock. 
 To be sure, the loose alliance enshrined in the For Fair Elections movement, already 
fraying by some accounts, had one last seminal event to plan around: the Presidential 
inauguration on 7 May 2012.  Udaltsov, on behalf of the movement, obtained a permit once 
again to march from Kaluzhskaya Square to Bolotnaya and hold a rally there on 6 May.  The 
week before the demonstration witnessed a massive influx – hundreds of thousands – of 
additional interior troops and riot officers as well as detachments of the specialized ODON 
division (a unit of the Interior Ministry). 
 In the early hours of the afternoon, between 25,000 and 40,000 exited the Oktyabrskaya 
metro station and assembled on the broad thoroughfare north of Kaluzhskaya Square.  After 
waves of protesters – principally under the direction of Udaltsov and Left Front activists – 
situated themselves behind several banners endorsing the ouster of Putin, the two kilometer 
march began.  At the end of that road just beyond the entrance to Bolotnaya stood three lines, 
each a few men deep, of interior ministry troops and riot officers.  Behind these lines were tight 
formations of service vehicles, troop carriers, buses, and windowless Black Marias. 
 When the main body of the march neared Bolotnaya, a line of troops blocked their access 
via the western bridge.  Some protesters crossed a footbridge to the east, but most remained on 
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the boulevard.  Groups began attempting to push through the police lines and march on the 
Kremlin.  It remains unclear what role opposition leaders played in attempting to march to Red 
Square.  For his part, Udaltsov was on the eastern end of Bolotnaya Square (having crossed the 
footbridge) when clashes began.  Speaking from the previously constructed dais, he encouraged 
the hundreds gathered on the square to join the rest of the demonstrators in occupying the area.  
While delivering this announcement, Udaltsov was taken under arrest by several police officers 
and rushed away from the square to the northeast.  Alexei Navalny and Boris Nemtsov were 
captured and evacuated in the same manner. 
 Violent altercations between riot officers and protesters continued into the evening.  
Protesters pelted troops with bottles, debris, and a few Molotov cocktails.  Roving groups of riot 
officers penetrated the ranks of the demonstrators and seized aggressive individuals.  Slowly, 
after dozens of police and protester injuries and several hundred arrests, the demonstrators 
dispersed, trudging back toward the Oktyabrskaya metro station. 
 The next day, opposition activists were driven away from the route of Putin’s inaugural 
convoy.  As President Putin took the oath of office, bands of a few thousand protesters, police 
forces, and pro-government youth groups played an extended cat-and-mouse game on the streets 
of the city center.  A youthful group of protesters headed southward on Nikitskiy Boulevard in an 
attempt to approach the Kremlin via Noviy Arbat, but found their path blocked by a wall of riot 
troops.  They wheeled round and headed north to Pushkin Square (and supposedly from there 
down to the Kremlin via Tverskaya Street).  Nashi activists delayed them at the southern end of 
the Tverskaya Boulevard Park.  After a half-hour march, during which troop carriers sped 
passed, the march met a line of police opposite from Pushkin Square.  The officers dispersed the 
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march, drove back the demonstrators, and detained scores.  Various news reports describe similar 
events around the city.  
 Back in the President’s office, Putin wasted little time; new restrictions on NGO activity 
and public assemblies passed during his first months in office, including drastic increases in fines 
for unsanctioned protests (a sixty-fold increase for culpable individuals, and forty-fold for 
organizations) and a bill requiring domestic NGOs in receipt of foreign grants or monies to carry 
the label “foreign agent,” a moniker with adverse Soviet connotations.139  Among the myriad 
other recent government actions designed to restrict opposition network activity, the Kremlin 
demanded the evacuation of USAID from Russia in late September 2012.  Even if some of its 
operations are conducted in absentia, the expulsion of the U.S. government’s largest conduit of 
foreign aid raises existential concerns for the already weak transnational opposition network, as 
it is currently constituted.  
Effect of Transnational Networks of Support in the For Fair Elections movement 
 In the five-month period between State Duma elections, the presidential election, and 
Putin’s inauguration, demonstrations and public displays of civic unrest “took place in 96 cities 
across the country.”140  An almost inestimable number of international and domestic actors – 
with a correspondingly high diversity of motivations, methods, and goals – contributed to the 
swell of anti-government activism.  The For Fair Elections movement of Moscow and other 
major cities was perhaps the most prominent of these opposition exertions. 
 Like other color movements, For Fair Elections fought governmental tampering with the 
citizenry’s electoral rights.  In all likelihood (as in Belarus in 2006), a free and fair vote would 
not affect the outcome of Russia’s presidential vote, merely the margin by which Putin secured 
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victory, nor would legitimate elections greatly altar the nature of the Duma.  Thus, the 
opposition’s struggle was one of principal and not of practical reality. 
 Unlike other cases, Russia’s opposition did not fully exploit the resources possessed by 
its transnational network of support.  Some domestic actors worked with Western partners while 
others abhorred the thought.  Such wide divergence of opinion and position typified the For Fair 
Elections movement and resulted in loose affiliations and tenuous bonds uncharacteristic of 
effective transnational networks.   
 Furthermore, the concept of one alliance uniting several distinct communist, socialist, 
democratic, and fascistic nationalist factions and interests is laughably unsustainable.  It would 
surely test the bonds of a sturdy network system, and quickly unravel weaker associations (as it 
did in Russia).  Indeed, given the ideological disparity among the For Fair Elections coalition, it 
is a wonder that more groups did not mimic Society “Memorial” and refuse to join the 
movement, citing the futility of aligning with parties that hold virtually no other (besides distaste 
for the Putin regime) values in common.141  This fundamental weakness speaks to the necessity 
of unifying values to bind a transnational network.  In Russia, while leaders like Garry Kasparov 
and Boris Nemtsov called for liberal democratic regimes modeled on the West, several of their 
partners in opposition were championing profoundly different political realignments: Sergei 
Uldatsov calling for a return to a Soviet system, Vladimir Tor advocating a radically nationalist 
regime, and so on.  
 Most importantly, the opposition network faced a regime with the most sophisticated 
repression and counterrevolutionary measures yet encountered in the post-Soviet space.  
Studious observation of and experience with color revolutions in adjacent countries effectively 
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inoculated Russia against the “democracy virus.”  The efficacy of the pro-government network – 
Nashi, NTV, VTsIOM, etc. – attests to the strength of networks of support. 
 In the absence of a fully developed transnational network of support, the opposition still 
achieved unprecedented mass mobilization and clearly engendered concerns among the top rungs 
of state authority.  This fact should prompt concerns within the Putin regime of the potential 
power of the opposition if those comprehensive network methods are employed.  The swift 
restrictive actions of the reinstated President Putin indicate an understanding of the opposition’s 
capacity to agitate for change. 
 
Assessing Transnational Networks in Color Movements 
 Placing the potential causal factors – including the presence of transnational networks, 
the strength of existing networks, and the degree of authoritarian backlash – in a “truth table”142 
creates a precise structure to test the role of observed variables in the sociopolitical phenomena 
of color revolutions.  
 Table 1 presents possible elements of successful color revolutions.  Therein, A resilient 
interconnected web of independent media outlets, NGOs and political parties, and foreign donor 
organizations agencies constitutes a “strong network.” “Significant authoritarian backlash” 
corresponds to the implementation of a restrictive legal framework that hinders transnational 
network activity as well as the exercise of governmental and extra-governmental means of 
opposition harassment and suppression.   
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Table 1: A truth table of potential causal variables of color revolutions in the examined cases. 
(created by author) 
 As the table shows, the presence of a strong transnational network is positively correlated 
with successful color revolution.  Conversely, significant authoritarian backlash – such as the 
restrictive laws and state harassment in Belarus, and the moderate legal harassment and 
persistent agitation of pro-government networks in Russia – is inversely related to color 
revolution. 
 Other variables may contribute to the capacity of a color movement to achieve regime 
change.  The presence of a central, unifying revolutionary figure is surely a significant factor.  
Saakashvili and especially Yushchenko were vital to their movements, whereas Milinkevich was 
fairly obscure before the 2005-06 presidential campaign in Belarus, and Russia’s opposition 
contained numerous influential figures without one of paramount importance.  The timing and 
nature of election cycles may also represent a weighty condition.  Belarus’s presidential election 
was not preceded by parliamentary elections; furthermore, Election Day was scheduled for 19 
March possibly to discourage would be protesters from demonstrating in freezing temperatures.  
Nevertheless, these and other conditions and factors are probably of ancillary importance. 
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 In so far as their unfettered operation bolsters and fundamentally contributes to the 
strength and skill of crucial opposition sectors – election monitors and pollsters, independent 
media, mobilizing groups, and political parties – transnational networks constitute an integral 
element of a successful color revolution movement.  Cooperation within a strong, if perhaps 
informal network system acts as a sustainable multiplier of opposition resources and potency.  
Conversely, weak networks may deliver surprising results, but simply cannot be sustained 
effectively over long periods. 
 The case of Russia’s For Fair Elections movement demonstrates the essential fact that 
transnational advocacy networks are necessarily value-driven.  The absence of a core of unifying 
values handicaps the formation of a resilient and interconnected web of organizations, agencies, 
and political parties.  Vast ideological incongruence among the For Fair Elections movement 
prevented it from congealing into anything more sturdy and robust than a loose association with 
a common enemy. 
 The dynamic of a strong network faced with significant authoritarian backlash 
(unobserved in the four cases presented in this paper) undoubtedly would clarify the extent of a 
transnational networks’ decisiveness in color revolution movements.  This eventuality, however, 
is unlikely due to the reciprocal nature of opposition networks and governing regimes.  In other 
words, a sufficiently liberal sociopolitical environment, which allows for transnational network 
development, is incompatible with an authoritative governmental system capable of generating 
substantial and persistent measures of network suppression. 
 The potentially decisive role (along with other revolutionary characteristics) of 
transnational democratic networks in precipitating and effectively navigating color revolutions 
has not escaped the notice of other (semi-) authoritarian regimes in the post-Soviet space (and 
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beyond).  In the wake of revolutions in Serbia, Georgia, and Ukraine, a trend of so-called 
“authoritarian backlash” spread throughout the hitherto unchallenged authoritarian states in 
Eastern Europe and Eurasia.  Innovative and sweeping measures that empowered coercive forces 
to harass incessantly and that created parallel networks to cow the opposition using a system that 
mirrored their organizational strength.  With a set of well-developed tools, specifically 
counterrevolutionary mechanisms and (or at least) an unwavering coercive apparatus, 
authoritarian regimes have neutralized transnational democratic networks and forestalled would-
be color revolutions.  Thus, successful color revolution is highly unlikely in cases without the 
intra-regime preconditions, no matter the strength of an opposition network (although, an 
internally secure regime typically produces a correspondingly weak opposition). 
 A well-established transnational democratic network represents one essential factor in 
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143 "Russia Votes." Centre for the Study of Public Policy - University of Strathclyde. 
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